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INTRODUCTION 
The problem of love has fasoinated thinkers and writers 
of all times, while it oan hardly be denied that the fact of love 
!has influenoed the life of every man f or good or evil. But love 
is experienced and realized in many forms, from that most obvi-
-' 
ously manifested in the love of a mother f or her child to the in-
effable love of God for man revealed in the Christian religion. 
Literature is replete with attempts, more or less sucoessful, to 
express the mysterious nature of this fundamental experience of 
man in its diverse forms. Nor, as is well known, has the sub-
ject been negleoted by philosophers. In reoent years there has 
been a renewed interest in the question, perhaps because 01' an 
ever widening awareness of the radioal need for love among men 
to restore order and ll..nity to a seemingly chaotic world. 
The oontemporary Frenoh philosopher, Gabriel Maroel, 
(1890- ), who is frequently clessed among the modern existen-
tialists, is not alone, then, in his speoulations on the nature 
and meaning of love. While r~oelts professional talent as a 
dramatist gives added force to his philosophical expression, the 
inspiration and direction of his thought in general is new, 
1 
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vital, and worthy of the studied consideration of all who are 
concerned to restore philosop~v--and metaphysics in partioulBx--
to its rightful place of eminence. 
It is the specific purpose of this paper to offer an 
exposition of some of the basic points in Gabriel Marcel's a.nnl-
ysie of love 1/1 HOl!';-ever, in order to do this wi. thout dOing avoid-
able violence to the profundity and complexity of his thought, it 
has been conSidered necessary to give first a genera.l exposition 
.-
of his philosophical views. In the final chapter of this paper 
we hope to show some parallel lines of thoug)1t among contemporary 
scholastic philosophers and to consider in PI'''Irt the rele,ted 
problem of knowledge in Marcel. 
With one exception Gabriel Maroel's purely philosophi-
cal writings have appeared in the form of the journal or the es-
say.. The exoeption is of recent da.te and consists in the publi-
cation of the Gifford Leotures which he delivered in 1949 and 
1950.1 However, he has also written at least seventeen P18Y8. 2 
While we have not used his plays in this study, a word on the 
rele assigned by Marcel to the drama should be noted. Maroel 
1 Gabriel Marcel, The M~steH of Bei~: I. Reflection 
f:'nd b13ste*t, Ohicago, 1951. Onl"y--nerst vo ume of these leo-
tures has een published to date. Volume II is scheduled for 
publioation in Fall, 1951. 
2 A list of these plays is given by Roger Troisfon-
taines in Extstentialisme Chr~tien. Gabriel Marcel, edt .b7tienne 
Gilson, Pai'1s, '9~9t 209.' --
.3 
finds in the drama a medium throueh which can be conveyed the 
spiritual oonflicts which man experiences. However, his plEtYs 
cannot simply be considered philosophical dialogues. Rather, they 
are intended to portray some of the concrete metaphysical si tua-
tiona of life. ,And 
Thus the ground was prepared aesthetically tor the philo-
sophical investigations concerning being and haVing, death, 
love, the test, and presence •••• In the dramametaphysi-
cal thought seizes upon itself for the first time in con-
creto: the import of human exi~tence first is Bnd tnen-Is 
given theoretical f'ormulation. 5 -- -
In this connection it is interesting to note that one of' the most 
important of Maroel's philosophical essays, "Position et approohes 
ooncr~tes du myst~re ontologique," appeared first as an appendix 
to the play, ~ Monde oasa!. 
AS referenoes are frequently found to several of Mar-
cel's essays which have been gathered together and published in 
book form, we refer the reader to the bibliography, where the 
essays will be listed under the title of the book in which they 
noVi appear. 
3 James Oollins, "Gabriel Maroel and the W~stery of 
Being," Thoueht, New York, XVIII, 1943, 669. 
GENBRi~L OHARAOTFmISTICS 
AND METHOD OF NlARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY 
!he whole of Gabriel Mprcel's philosophical writings 
are marked by his violent reaction against the idealism of Des-
cartes, Kant, Hegel and their interpreters and against the methodlo 
reduotion of thought to a system, V':hich these philosophies offer 
as a oomplete explanation for the whole of reality. Inasmuoh as 
Maroel began his own philosophical itinerary from wi thin the 
struoture of idealism, it may be well, without gOing into the 
oomplexities of idealism in its various forms, to oonsider a few 
of the general oharaoteristios of this position. 
The prim~ry postulate of idealism is an epistemological 
one. A subjeot 'of knowledge is in immediate oontaot only vdth 
his idea.s and not with things exist ing extramentally. Between 
the subjeot and extramental objects there is an irreducible oppo-
sition whioh cannot be dissolved by any process of knowledge whio 
will enable the subjeot to be united in any direot way with the 
objeot. Universal ideas whioh are the object of thought aooount 
for, exhaust, E'nd in some formulations of idealism cause the 
4 
entire reality of whatever exists outside the mind. Absolute 
knowledge is thus possible through a dialectical process whereby 
the thinking subjeot may proceed from idea to idea and eventually 
encompass the whole of reality. Bxistenoe itself is no problem; 
it is simply absorbed into thought, with the result that indivi-
dual existing things have no ontoloeica1 status. In such a posi~ 
tion, objective knowledge takes on a peculiar meaning, consisting 
in a ~~ow1edge of necessary essences, or universals, or natures, 
-" 
which the subject confronts within itself but which, if the point 
were pressed, do not exist as knowable in the things we sense or 
experience in our ever,yday encounters with things. But at the 
same time the objeotive charaoter of knowledge not only dominates 
but exoludes any transcendent element in the sense that the ob-
ject, whioh is an idea, fully acoounts for itself and the reality 
it represents, allowing no room for anything transcendine it or 
any real partiCipation of the subject as knower in the world of 
eA~ernal objects.1 
In the degraded rationalism of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century man--the individual, the person--is divested of 
all reality, all warth. He truly becomes a oog in a gigantic 
machine. If he is oonsidered at all either by himself or by 
1 Maroel de Oorte, ~ Ph11osoph1!! 2.! Gabriel Marcel, 
Paris, (no date), 46-52. 
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others, it is only as "an agglomeration of function lt ,2 social, 
biological, or psychological. "Cause explains effect and ao-
counts for it exhaustively.,,3 There is no longer any meaning to 
words such as mystery, existence, liberty. 
It is this that Marcel rebelled against. While he be-
gpn his philosophicel speoulations vii th a refutation of ration;::;l 
ism and the ideal of absolute knowledge4 and progressed to a pos 
tive and integral realism,5 his fundamental problem concerns the 
--",," 
existence of man, and it is at this center thnt the various line 
and aspects of his thought converge. Recognizing man's need for 
transcendent reality, 
Marcel could not remain setisfied with an object which 
had been artificially severed by classical idealism and by 
Husserlian phenomenology from its setting in concrete con-
tingent reality. More than a decade before Hartmann he was 
pleading for a return to ontology. Similarly, he antio.i-
pated the more reoent inVestigations of Heidegger and Jas-. 
pers into the human 8i tUB.tio!) e.s temporal and existential. () 
2 Gabriel Maroel, The l)hilosop~i 2! Existence, trans. 
Manya Harari,-wew York, 1949,-r; 
3 Ibid., 4. 
-
4 Cf. espeCially Marcel's Journal M~taphysigue. 1913-
1922' 5th ed., PariS, 1935, particularly Part One. 
5 Oollins, "Gabriel M(lroel pnd the ~tystery of Being," 
ThOUfht, XVIII, 673-675. The nature of Marcel t s realism wl.ll 
be d scussed in greater deteil ls.ter; of. inf'ra, 63-64. 
6 Ibid., 676. The first important \\Orks of Heidegger 
and JRspers dra-fiot appear until 1927 and 1932 respectively, 
while the main work.s of Kierkegaard were not translated from 
the Danish until 1920 &nd later. 
-7. 
Maroel, of oourse, is not unique in his reaction against 
rationalism B,nd idealism. It is, on the o ontrary , the primary im .. 
pulse of those modern philosophers since Kierkegeard who have come 
to be oalled Existentialists. On the positive side this com~on 
reaction seeks to center its philosophical speoulation around the 
problem of the indi viduA.l human existent, his situation in the 
world and his relation to other existents. In all the members of 
this fI school" there is an explici t consoiousnes~.3 of the relation 
between life and doctrine. From this baSis of concern for human 
existence, however, sevf?..ral diverBent lines develop. Here 'We may 
discern some of the characteristios of Gabriel M!iTcel' s thotl[;ht. 
While, for example, the German existentialist, Martin Heidegger, 
previsions the system[;.tic orientation of a philosophy of existence 
culminating in the construction of an ontology, Marcel hesita.tes 
to affirm this direction. Although admitting the possibility of 
developing a concrete philosophy, he does not believe tha-t; this 
It'Vould be a formal philosophy of being, i.e., an ontology. Hat her 
it would be a systemization of the essentiBl exigencies of man 
springine from his need for pn Absolute.? Thus, it is not so 
much a philosophy of existence as a philosophy of existing, con-
cerned with existents in their very singularity.8 Or as one of 
7 Regis Jolivet, Les Doctrines Existentialistes de 
Kierkegaerd ! J • .:!:_ Sartre, maye S. Wandrille, 1948, 9-10:-
8 Ibid .. , 304. 
-
8 
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his better ori tios J Maroel de corte t expresses Marcel's particulaJ 
emphasis, it is not so much about existenoe as in ~ very 12res-
ence of eXistenoe.9 
--
Perhaps these distinctions will be clearer if we notice 
for a moment just what Maroe1's oonoeption of philosophy is, or 
rather, what philosophy should be. "}b.ilosophy," he tells us,10 
r'will always, to my way of thinking, be an aid to disoovery ratheJ 
than a matter of striot demonstration." But, we may ask, what is 
/ 
the term of this approaoh, whpt are we seeking to disoover? 
Truth, certainly, but for Marcel truth does not consist in the 
logical coherence of a system of ideBs. Rather it is judged by 
the sincerity and the authentioity of the experiences which have 
led to these ideas. 11 Truth is a spirit, a light: 
Truth is not a thi~; whatever definition we may in the 
end be induoed to give 0 the notion of truth, we can affirm 
even now that trtlth is not a. physic8.l object, that the 
search for truth is not a physioCtl process, that no general ... 
izations that apply to physioE'.l objects Dnd processes can 
apply also to truth. 12 
To have objective knowledge of something is to know that thing in 
its essence, its neoessity, and its eternity. It is to know it 
9 La Phi1osophie de G. M., 43. Cf. Etienne Gilson, 
Existentialism; Chr~tien: Gabriel Marcel, 7. 
10 !lstery of Bein~t 1-2. 
11 Roger ,Troisfontaine, '8xistenti8lisme Chretien: 
Gabriel Marcel, ed. E. Gilson, 210. 
12 Marcel, Mystery of Being, 18. 
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en almost infinite field of investigation open to him, the field 
of the manifold situations of human existence. In these situa-
tions he seeks to penetrate the meaning of the "In and the pro-
~ound depths of being in which and by which ttl am."17 We have 
sa.id that for Marcel philosophy is perpetually progressive, and 
thiS is because i'ts object is fundamentally historic. Hence, it 
is built up (or as Marcel would prefer to say. it is hollowed out 
or it lays a foundation) ~t the same time that it is precticed. 
~ 
It is engaged in life its,elf; it is lived!!! ~ exercito.18 
For a philosophy so conceived Marcel sees in phenomen-
ology a method best adapted to its investigations. !Jet us keep 
in mind from the outset, however, that for Marcel the phenomeno-
logical method is and remains a tool, an instrument for examine .. 
tion, Dnd in no way is identified with the result aChieved. 
While it remains true that 
• • • between a philosophical investigation and its final 
outcome, there exists a link which cannot be broken wi-thout 
the summing up itself immediately lOSing all reality, 9 
this is not to say that this "summing up" is Simply the totality 
of the investigations pursued, as would be the case in Husserlts 
system of phenomenology. 
17 Maroel, ~ Refus, 89. 
18 de Gorte, !:.t Philosophie ~ ft. !_, 44. 
19 Maroel, ~~ste;y £! Being, 5. 
11 
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In the hands of Mrrcel, the instrument is used for a de'" 
scriptXve analysis of concrete human situations. He accepts what 
v:e call our everyday experiences, and with acute profundity ex-
amines them in all their tr~1gic an.d hopeful implications. He is 
concerned to show the intention of these experiences rather than 
their psychological content, without attempting to explflin them 
by reducing them to their Simple elements. 20 Further, it is to bE 
noted that the situation being ~1nalyzed is taken in its entirety 
PDa all the aspects of a person involved/in en experience of what ... 
ever nattrre are considered. For example, in his discussion of thE 
question of the union of soul and body, f4l.arcel does not prescind 
from the feeling one has of an intimate connection between "me and 
my body."21 On the contrary, the subjective aspect of feelins in 
this instance takes its place alone side of the evidence of unity 
manifested externally and is inoluded in the totality of the livec 
experience. Indeed, it seems to be one of the characteristio 
marks of Marcel's philosophy that, while it becomes necessf~.ry at 
times fo!' him to "distineuish in order to unite," he is constantlJ 
awere of and stresses the feet of man's unity. Let us cite just 
a few of the many texts whioh brine out this emphasis; 
20 Riooeur, Marcel at Jaspers, 77; cf. ~arcel, Du 
Refu~t 55. "Je proc~deral suivant 18 m~thode qui mtest habIruelle 
et qui consiste dans une E:nalyse non p~lS du fait de consoience, 
mas plutat du contenu de conscience, c'est-A.-dire de oe que la 
conscience a r~ellement en vue dans un certain nombre de situa-
tions-types, nettement discernables les unes des autres." 
21 Mvstery of Being, 94. 
12 
• 
• •• we cannot isolate, in order to transform them into 
distinct entities, the various ",\spects of a. single life, 
'which is, precisely, the life of .2!!! self .22 
• •• we must be very oareful indeed to avoid artificielly 
separating oue level of the self from the other; we must 
avoid assuming that the self of reflection E.md ingflthered-
ness is not the same self as that of lust and vengeanoe. 
We are not in the-pE'ysical world. .;:nd oanrlot say, "There is 
this self, there is that self," as we might say, "There is 
an apple, there is an orange." I would prefer to call our 
two selves, wl1ich are not really two selves, or our two 
levels of the self--\'ihich have not, however, the sharp 
meclsureable gap between them that the notion of a level 
physioally implies--different module,tiona of eXistence. 23 
It would certainly not be proper to"'deny the legitimacy of 
making distinctions of order wl thin the unity of a, living 
subject, who thinks and strives to think of himself. But 
the ontological problem can only arlse oeyond such distinc-
tions, and for the living being grasped in his full unity 
and vitality.24 
It is perhaps obvious that the use of the phenomeno-
logical method in a philosophy of the concrete will in all like-
lihood be aooompanied by concrete examples and illustrstions. 
However.,. for MaIoel the illustrative device is an essential com ... 
ponent of the method, without which the truth to be attained 
would never develop. As he says: 
• • • for a philosophic approach like ours, whioh is es-
sentially a concrete rather than an abstr~:ct approE:ch, the 
use of examples is not merely an auxiliary process butt on 
the contrary t an essential part of our method of progreS!3-
ing. An example, for us, is not merely an illustration of 
22 Ibid., 69. 
23 Ibid", 130. 
-
24 Gabriel Maroel, Being ~ Hevin~, trans. Katherine 
Woa+mi nRtA'r M:nQ'1 AnN .1949. 1'/1. 
13 
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an idea which v','as fully in being even before it wes illus-
trated. I vvould rather compare the pre-existine; idea to a 
seed; I have to plpnt it in the genial soil that is consti-
tuted by the ex£'mple before I can really see what sort of a 
seed it is; I keep a v,lltch on the soil to see what the seed 
grows up into.25 
The results of investigations at this level do not give 
ontological truths, however. In fact, for a Single phenomen-
~ogy severe.l truths are possible, which would not be the c[;se it' 
(perience were a purely objective fact. But if the observer is 
1 integral part of the observed date, the ~xperiences difl'er BC-
r:r:-ding to the points of view he adopts. 26 Hence, while remain-
tg on the phenomenological level, the philosopher cannot make 
ly pretentions to a universally valid rnetaphysics. 27 For Maroel 
)wever, these preliminary investigations are an approach Hnd a 
tide. They merely provide a series of deeply probed experit'mces 
)inting to something beyond the observe.ble date and revealing 
m's need for trr:;TIscendence. The nature of this exigency in man 
) well ps the nature of its object, Bre the more properly ph11o-
>phical questions, not to be solved, of course, but to be lived. 
t this higher level of' discourse, the distinctive instrument of 
25 ~!!yste!l 2f Beins, 116. 
26 Roger Troisfontaine. Existentialisme et Pens~e 
rr~tienne, Peris, 1946, 77-78. 
27 It is in their failure to recognize the limits of 
tenomenology and in their consequent claim to describe the 
lthentic unig,ue experience that the philosophers of £1,theistic 
~sp8ir are to be criticized. (Cf. ibid., 78.) 
-
I""" 
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philosophica.l thout~ht, i.e., reflection, is brought into play. 
',::e shall see later in some detail the importa.nt place of reflec-
r;ion in Marcel's philosophy. At this point let us just briefly 
~ndicate its r6le. There are t"vo stages of reflection. The 
if'irst or primary reflection on an experience tends to dissolve it 
~nto its several parts so far as they can be separated and viewed 
fi,s objects apart. Seoondary reflection. hov, ever , recognizes and 
reconquers the unity of that experienoe in an essentially recup-
erative movement of thought, As it is the vital purpose of phil-
osophy to reveal man's conorete situation in its totality, the 
~atter stage of reflection is the tfspecial high instrument of 
philosophical research. fl28 
There is one further point which should be oonsidered 
before proceeding to an exposition of Maroel's philosophy. Mar-
cel has been r:: ooused of developine a philosophic view ~'.hich is 
intrinsioe.lly oonneoted with ~md dependent upon his religious 
beliefs,29 perhaps beoause of his frequent preoccupation with 
~he Christian notions of faith, hope, charity and salvation. 
~uch criticisms, however, reveal a thorough misunderstanding of 
MBIcel t s method and starting point. First of 8.11, it is a Y.nOV'Jn 
28 M.arcel, Myster'y of Being, 83. 
29 Of. Merjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom, Chioago, 1948, 
130-132; Guido de Ruggiero, Existentialism. taslntesration of Man' 
Soul, ed. Reyner Heppenstall, New York, '~48t 46, and Rappen.:-
stall's introduction, pE'.ge 11. 
15 
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;fact that Marcel was not baptized until 1929, when he joined the 
Cr::tholic Church, fifteen years f~f>ter the original entry in his 
first Journal and six years ai'ter its completion. Now, v,hile it 
is true that his subsequent writings and lectures contain marked 
developments end some revisions. it is equally apparent to anyone 
who will subject his earlier and later works to a comparative 
(,nalysis that the conclusions to which he is led by his more ma-
ture reflection are imp11cit in the first recordings of his spec-
--ulation. Nor can Marcel be charged with confounding the natural 
and the supernatural: 
I should like to note that from my own standpoint the 
distinotion between the na{5ural £:md the supernc.tural must 
be rigorously mpintained." 
Marcel reoognizes the specific nature of the philosophic 
discipline and does not base his thought on ! pI'iori supposi tiona 
of the Christian revelation. Throughout the Journal he is con-
cerned with speoulation on the act of faith, an:>lyzing the de-
scribing the concrete conditions n~oeasary for a person to place 
such an 8ct.31 Later, after his oonversion he describes his 
spiritual experience ~:md reflects on his ovvn aot of faith,32 but 
30 M·sI.'cel, Philosophy of Existence, 30. 
183. 
31 Journal M~taphysigue, especially 33-39, 68-73, 182-
32 Bein5 ~ Hevin,€S, especiElly 203-216; ~ Refus, 
espeCially, 158-182. 
-16 
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his perspeotive alv'Jays remains philosophio. He legitime.tely neg-
lects oertain aspeots of his experience v;ihioh vvould be of perticu-
lar interest to the theologian or at least only mentions them in 
pa.ssing. 33 ttThe philosopher," MflY.'cel tells us,34 must not be 
apart from hiG world." If he is to reveal the significanoe of the 
human experienoe he must himself be implicated in it and must take 
into aOcoWlt all that it implies of oontingenoy and relative nec-
essity. He oan thus no more abstract from the historic situation 
./ 
in whioh he is pIa oed than be oan disregard the more immediate 
elements of oonsoiousness and feeling. Maroel himself aptly 
justifies his position and direotion on this pointe 
A serious objeotion remains to be mentioned. It will 
perhaps be said r All that you have said implies Em unformu-
lated refe:rence to the data of Christianity and can only 
be understood in the light of these data. Thus we under-
stand whflt you mean by presence if iNe think of the Eucharist 
and what you mean by oreative fidelity if we think of' the 
Ohurch. But whnt oan be the value of suoh a philosophy 
for those who are a-Christie.n--for those who ignore Chris-
tianity or ~ho do not aocept it? I would enswer: it is 
quite possible that the existence of the fundamental O11ris-
tian data may be necessary in fact to enable the mind to 
oonoei ve some of the notionswfiI"Cfi I have ai;tempted to 
analyse; but these notions oannot be said to depend on the 
data of Christianity, and they do not ~resup¥0se it. On 
the other hand, should I be tolat'Eiit he in el1ect must 
leave out of account anything whioh is not a universHl da.ta 
of thinking as such, I would say that this claim is exag-
gerated and in the last anelysis, illusory. Now, as at 
33 Pierre Oolin, in B:x1stentialisroe Ohretien: Gabriel 
Mercel, ad. Gilson, 13-14. 
34 Mysterl!?!. Beil1f£, 36. 
17 
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any other time,',he philosopher is plro;ced in e given histori-
cal situation from w\uch he is most unlikely to abstract 
himself completely; he would deceive himself if he thought 
that he could create a complete void both within and around 
himself. Now this historical situation implies as one of 
its essential data the existence of the Christian fact--
quite independently of whether the Christian religion is ac-
cepted and its fundamental assertions are regarded as true 
or false. Whet appears to me evident is that we cannot 
rea.son today as though there were not behind us centuries of 
Christianity, just as, in the domftin of the theory of know-
ledge, we ca.nnot pretend that there have not been centuries 
of positive science. But neither the existence of Christi-
anity nor that of positive science pleWs in this connection 
.more than the role of a fertilising principle. It favors 
the development of certain ideas wh~h ~Jve might not have can .. 
cei ved vlJ:Lthout it. This development may take plnce in what 
I would call para-Christian zones; for myself, I have ex-
perienced it I1lOLe than twenty years before I had the ramo·t-
est thought of becoming a Cntholic.35 
35 PhilosgphY!?! I!b<istence, 29-30. 
• 
OHAPTFlR III 
GABRIEL MAROEL' S PHILOSOPHY OJ!' F:XISTtNG 
It is a constant haZf~rd of a.ny philosophy based on ex-
perience to succumb to the temptation of subjectivism. Gabriel 
Marcel is acutely aware of this danger and constantly strt ves to 
avoid the pitfall. Most of his critics and 1ntllrpreters agree 
thpt he has been successful here.' 
,-
It is true, of course, that 
his epproach has been and will no doubt remain, ~ubjeotive, but 
there is a difference between authentic subjecttvity and subjec-
ti vism which is the difference between truth anQ error. l'he pat 
between subjectivism and pure objectivity whiohMarcel has chose 
to follow is no doubt etroit e~ sinueux, but t a~ we hope the 
following pages will show, it can be safely tr~::\tersed. 
The very notion of experience reveals the dangers. :E<lX 
perienoe is not something that is given to us f~om the outside, 
'i.e., it is not something that can be dissected into any number 
of parts which can be anely~ed and which taken together add up 
to a given situation. Wi thin an experience there is, so to 
1 E.g. J Troisfonta.ines, Existentiuliame et l'enst,e 
OhrC§tienne, 17 .. 18; Colin, in Existentialism.,! Oh~ien: Gabriel 
ME:rcel, ad. Gilson, 29-31; R1coeur, r;~aroel !1~spers, 79-S3. 
18 
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speak, an element which is not reducible to a. given or an object, 
and it is this element in fact which renders the situation a 
IUnified whole. For within any and every experience there is its 
sub ject , the tt I", who is intimately involved and whose involve-
ment gives meaning to the experience. I can never stand away from 
p situation which is ~, view it from the outside, abstract from 
my own engagement in it, and still matntain that it is !:1t experi-
ence. 
IJet us see how these remarks bear on what, from one 
point of view, is the starting point of }1!t~.rcel' s philosophy. 
YJha.t I can neither prove nor place in doubt is my o\vn existence. 
This is what Y..arcel calls the existential 1ndub1table, the touch-
s·):one or primordial existent, which if it were a.enied would pre-
clude the possibility of a.ffinnine the existence of anything 
else.2 The self here involved is not, however, the 111" of the 
Cartesian coSito, the epistemological self. It is rather the im-
mediately existential "I", which can only be recognized and not 
deduoeds 
La rba11tb que lecosito r~v~le •• test dtun ordre tout 
d1ff#Jrent de 1 t existence dont neus tentons ici non point 
tant d t ~ta.blir que de reconnlHBre, de constater m~te.phy­
siquement Ie. p:riorit~ absolue. 
2 lIt1Yste;y.2f. Be1n~t 88; of. Journal ~1~tal'h,ys~que, 310-
314; Du Refus, 25* 
-
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Au d~phrt de cette investigation, il nous faudra pla.cer 
un indubitable, non pas logique ou rationnel, mais existen-
tial; 8i l' existenoe n' est p<~ s Ii. 1 t origine, elle ne sera 
nulle part; il nty a P[;3.S, je pense, de passage a I t existence 
qui ne soit esoamotage ou trioheria.4 
Howevp.Z', this privileged recognition of the existential "I'f has 
as its immediate oorrela.tive the reoognition of the selt as 
existing in the world: nOe qui m'est indubitablement donne, c'est 
l'experience contuae at globale du monde en tant qU'existant."5 
Now, the affirmation of this world of existents is based on my 
awareness of myself as existing in or with my body, 1.e., as an 
incarnate being: 
• • • mon corps est le rep~re par rapport auquel se posent . 
pour mol les existants, at, ajouterai-je, s'etablit 18. de-
marca:tion entre existence et non-existence. 6 
Through refleotion on this first datum of consciousness. I cun 
coma to an explicit recognition of other existents. 
It would perhaps be ',veIl to follow in some detail the 
phenomenological an[~.lysis of this experience of "me and my bodytf 
and see hm'l some of the roBin chara.cteristics of Marcel t s thought 
follow from or pertain to it.. Actually, one could ju.st as well 
consider any of the human experiences that :M8.roel subjects to 
scrutiny, for example, fidelity or hope, and show equally well 
the import of his speculation. We have ohosen this pnrticuler 
4 Du Refu3, 25. 
-
5 Journal ~etaph~s1que, 313. 
£ Thl RA:fus 28 
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experience as a center, however, for two main reasonss (1) It 
will have speoific application to ME:rcel t S treatment of the no-
tion of havin,S, to be oonsidered in the next chapter; and'(2) in 
his first systematic and full-blown presentation of his philoso-
phy (the Gifford Lectures), Mercel himself uses this as a start-
ing point. 
wrwt is this "In of which I say, "I exist", and of 
vvhich I am aware as being somehow or other oonnected with my 
" body? It seems that I can say th:1t I have my body, or that I 
use my body, or again that I am or f',m not my body.. 1!;hat is the 
significanoe of ell these statements which from one point of view 
appear to be entirely valid, yet aotually do not express the full 
ness of the oonjunction? The use of the possessive pronoun ~ 
'l'IJ uld seem to indioate f' reletion of ownership. If I then con-
sider my body as Simply my instrument, I am faoed with the ques-
tions an instrument of what? An instrument is merely a means of 
extending the virtual powers of its user, and if I say that my 
body is the instrument of my soul I attribute to my soul the 
virtual powers of the body, of which the soul is supposed to as-
sure the actualiz[~t1on. In effect, this is simrly to oonvert the 
soul into a body. And the same question is again in order, 
leading to an infinite regress. 7 The body is not necessery to 
the soul only clnd espec1~llly in the fashion of an instrument. 
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Rather, the body serves as e k1nd of sympathetio mediation prior 
Q 
to the instrumental mediation, (J although both are intimately 
mineled. 
Can I say t;hat I am identioal \\1. th my body? Suoh a. 
position implicitly nullifies the "I" in a. gross materie.lism,9 
while to deny any conneotion bet\-veen my self and my body 1s to 
deny an immediate and obvious fact of experience. 
We seem then to be able to maintain no knowable rela-
tion between the self and the body. And this should not be sur-
prising. For as soon as we at'firm a relation we set up two te.rms, 
each of whioh is Bn objeot that can be defined and verified. The 
two terms of the relation beoome a problem and a matter for sc1-
entific knowledge. But as such I place myself outside the rela-
tion, oonsidering myself then as a thi'rd iihing somehow relflted 
to this body.10 The!l no longer has any significance: "The 
moment I treat, my body as em ob ject of scientific knowledee, I 
banish myself to 1nfin1 ty. "'1 Thus J we have an 8,pparent paradox: 
Etre 1ncarn~. c'est s'appara!tre comme corps, oomme 
06 corps-ci, sans pouvoir stident1fier A lui, sans pouvoir 
non plus sten d1stinguer--identification et distinction 
8 Journal M#'tap~'si'lue, 239; of. Mysterl .2! ~e1!y?, 101 
9 ~ Refu!=! J 30 
10 ~bid •• 31-32. 
11 Being!.!!!! !!.Bving, 12; ct. Journal P&~tal?hys1'lue, 252. 
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~tant des op~rations corr~latlve Itune de l'autre, mais qui 
ne peuvant s'exercer que dans le sphere les objets. 12 
This fundamental link uniting me to my body is in the order of 
the meta-problematic, the order of mystery. 
Before gOing further, let us consider the oelebrated 
a.nd important distinotion that Marcel makes between problem and 
mystery. 
A mystery 1s a problem which encroaches upon its O~~l data, 
invading the!n, as it were, and thereby transcending itself 
as a simple problem.13 / 
A mystery cannot be reduced to the elements that constitute it 
nor to prior element S Emd, consequently , discursive thought is 
not possible. It transcends the order of subject-objeot. A 
problem, on the other hand, is concerned preoisely ~dth this 
subject-object relationship end can be ~melyzed in terms of its 
precedent elements, while in the prooess one term or set of terms 
can be substituted for another. 
-
A problem is something which I meet, w~l1ch I find com-
plete before me, but which I can therefore lay siege to and 
reduce. But a mystery is something in which I am myself in-
volved, and it can therefore only be thought of as fi sphere 
where the distinction between whet is in me and what is be-
fore me loses its meaning Emd its initipl validity.. /\ gen-
uine problem is subjeot to an eppropriate technique by the 
exercise of which it is defined: whereas 8 myst fU4 ' by deti'" nition, transcends every conceivable tec~~ique. 
12 Du Refus, 31. 
-
13 PhilesopBY ~ Existence t 8. 
14 Being ~ Hav1n~, 117. 
24 
• 
.Philosoph;)T is above all concerred with mystery and i·t is in this 
that it is distinguished from the sciences properly so-called 
whj.ch know only problems.15 It is the cap 1 tal error of philoso-
phY to degrade m;ystery by attempting to convert it into B problem 
or into pure objectivity under the pretext of thus mc:king it more 
intelligible.16 
However, we must be careful to avoid confusing the ordex 
of mystery "~th the unknowable. "11 nty a de myst~re que dans 
-' 
l'orare du OOnnEt1ssant."17 To apprehend a mystery is precisely to 
reoognize it as mystery and not susceptible to being formulated iD 
objective terms or grasped in objective concepts, but this reoog-
nition is itself an essentiAlly positive act of the mind. based on 
a funda.mentAI intu! tion v.hich is, so to speak, broken up in a. re-
flection and recovered and understood in its unity in recollec-
tion.18 
15 !later: ~ Being, 213-216. 
16 Beins ~ Havir~, 117. 
17 Journal M~taphlsiquet 160. 
18 ¥!i~ and Hf:lVin~, 118: "The recognition of rnystery 
is e.n essentiB y poSItive ac of the mind, the supremely positive 
act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be striotly de-
fined. In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found 
myself acting on an intuition ~ ioh I possess without immediate-
ly know1ng myself to possess it--an intuition which cannot be, 
striotly speaking, self-oonscious ICnd whioh can grasp itself 
only through the modes of experience in m1ch its image is re ... 
flected, and which it lights up by beine thus reflected in them. 
The essential metaphys1cal step would then oonsist in a reflectior. 
I 
~ -~----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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What is the nature or the import of this primary intui-
tion? In 8 sense it can be said that what has been defined as 
~atery is the objeot of intuition. But some important preoisions 
have to be made here. This intuition cannot be purely and simply 
give'n as such. Properly speak1ng it is not something possessed. 
Rather, it seems to be an assurance that extends across or under-
lies every rnovement of thought. The more central it is the less 
it is able to turn back and apprehend itself. It oannot then be 
~ 
directly ~eflected in oonsOiOUS1'1ess. nor can l-t even_ be a1'-
pro;::ched exoept by a seoond reflection, ,",ihose funotion it is to 
inquire iTom what origin it has been possible to make the first 
reflection whioh postulated the ontological without knowing 1t.19 
We oan perhaps olar11'y these notions if we oonsider 
them in oonneotion i)';ith Marcelta approach to the oentral myster-
ies of being and knowledge. Kno"""ledge by its very nature trans-
oends itself. Thought is always thought of something other than 
1tself.20 This is to say that ?mile thought bears only on 
upon this refleotion (in a refleotion 'squared'). By means of 
this thought stretches out towards the reoover.f of an intuition 
which otherwise loses itself in proportion as it is exercised. 
"Reflection, the ~·;ctual possibility of' which may be 
regarded as the most revealing ontological index we possess, is 
the real place in whose oentre this reoovery can be made." 
19 PhilosoPAl 2f Existence, 13-14_ 
20 Bei~ ~ Havins, 30. 
~ ____ ------------->--~t--------------------------~ 
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essences, by this very process of objectivation it does not ex-
baust itself. The act of thinking cannot itself be adequately 
represented; it can only be grasped as such. Thus, there should 
be no contradiotion in the fact of thinkine; of a mystery. 21 From 
thiS it is olear that thou.ght is ir'1"1anen,t in being, and while 
beine is immanent in thought, it also transcends it. 22 Thought 
is not 11m:i.ted to particular beings; in f"n obscure i"tay it errives 
at being in itself: 
~ 
A blindfold knowledge of Being in general is implied 
in all particular knowledge", But here, take c~u:'e in what 
sense we use the words "Being in general." Obviously there 
is no question of Being emptied of its individual OhE1XflC-
teristics. I should express myself better if I said th:".t 
sinoe all knowledge oonoerns the thing and not the Idea of 
the thing--the Idea not being en object in itself and being 
1ncapable of oonversion into an object exoept by a subeequen 
21 Ibid. t 126. 
-
22 Ibid., 36. As early as 1912 Marcel saw the neeee-
si ty of this nO'tIOn for any kind of fl. realistic philosophy. He 
speaks of it in relation to a philosophy of intuition, and it 
would seem that at this tiMe the influenoe of' Bergson on his 
thought was particularly stronge "Une ph11osophie de l'intu1tion 
ne peut se oonstituer que sur IF' ba.se d tune dialeo'tique qui per-
mettrait d'etab11r l'1mmanenoe de If8tre en tent qu-@tre dans 
I t espr1t; une tel1e dielect1que elle-m~me suppose une critique du 
savoir absolu qui mPn1feste la transoendanoe de 18 pens~e par 
rapport au aavolr, et l'1ntu1tion m@me se r~duit flU fond A Ifaote 
par lequel 18 pens&e a~f'irme qutelle est en elle-m~me trans-
oendante A oe qui ntest en elle que pure objeotivit~." (tiLes 
Oonditions d1e,lectiques de le ph110sophie de Itintu1tion," Revue 
de m~tap~Si~ et morale, PariS, XX. 1912, 652.) Later, indeed, 
trarce! s ronglY cautions thHt oar'e must be taken in the use of 
the word 1ntu1 t1on, and 8,dds thDt it is Bergon' s theory of in-
tell.igenoe whIoh above [.;11 needs revision. ( tfD~.l' Audace en 
m~taphysique." Revue ,9;! m~taph.ysi que ~ morale ,III t If 08 • 3 ... 4 t 
1947, 240.) 
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thought-prooess of doubtful validity·-it implies that we Dre 
related to Beine. 23 
trhis entry WeS made at a time when :Marcel was making his greatest 
~ffo:rt "to break with every possible form of idealism. On this 
point at ls[:'_st the final decisive step is ma.de when he adds that 
being is not affirmed, but it affirms itself. 24 Thus, the justi-
fication of the ontological realism of Marcel does not depend on 
an epistemological inquiry: 
• • • there exists \lvell and tru.ly a JllYstery of cognition; 
lmowledge is contingent on a participation in being for 
which no epistemology can account because it continually 
presupposes it.25 
It is based, then, on an ineffable and mysterious mode of parti-
cipation in being, which we e:xperience by means of an intuition. 
\'lc~rcel de Oorte t s summary is particularly clefJI' and perletrating 
on this point I 
L'ontologie existentielle de M. Ga.briel rr,arcel se 
d~veloppe, ou semble se d~velopper. de 10 sorte, entre deux 
intuitions du myst~re de l'existence: celIe qui engage 
1 t ~tre qui Sf interroge sur sOi dans 1(;1 tot~li te de son ~tre 
concret. at celIe qui ai;teint t au del! de cet enga.gement 1a 
participation de ltexistencehuma.ine A Itint~gra1it~ merne 
de l'existence ooncr~te. Ella stedifie dialectiquernent sur 
un autre myst~re r celui de la conrul.issance, que nons ne 
pouvons esp~rer de p~n~trer en s01 puisqu'e11e est 
23 Bains and HaVin~ 28. Of. the important text from 
Du Refus, 193,-W-;.-:-j'al a is, me semble-t-il, a priori, bien 
~nt ae pouvoir tout A fait justifier ames propres yeux cette 
affirmation, que plus noua saurons reconnattre l'etre 1ndividuel 
en tant que tel f plus noua serons orientes et corrone r;chemin~8 
vers une sa.is1e de It&tre en tant qut~tre.u 
24 Philosoph? of Existence, 8. 
~r; ThiN 
-
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essentiellement experience globale immorcelable, transob-jecti ve6and transsub,jecti ve, en un mot, I?articipatiop elle 
aussi.~ 
To return to our oonsideration of the self existing as 
intimately linked with a body, we can now better understand the 
status of the question. If we are beyond the level of the prob-
lematic, how are we to anDlyse and elucidate this experience in 
order to bring out its real signifioanoe and perhpas even recog-
nize some of its metHphysical implioations? It is in an initial 
reflection that I think of myself as apax't from or in some kind. 
of relEltion with my body. A seoond reflection, however, brings 
me to the recognition of the fallaoy of this disruption of ;:, 
unity. I pass beyond the disjunotions and articulations of ab-
stract thought in returning to t~he conc::cete experience in its 
totality.27 Or, to speak more oorreotly, we are in a sphere 
where we cannot even speak of any relationship, The antinomy be-
tween myself and my body, interior and exterior, the same and the 
other, has been dissolved or transcended from the start. 
When I transfer my gaze to the world about me, I ex-
perienoe a oertain sreel which I also 00.11 mine. This experience 
26 La Phi1osophie de G.M., 10. l~erre Colin notes 
that for Mflroelporticipationdoes-not deSignate, as in Platon-
ism, the oommunioation of a same nature to different individuals. 
but rather the rapMrt spirituel of two free beings who consent 
to and ere united tn "eaoh otner, eaoh respeoting the personalltlr 
of the other. (Ex1stentialisme Ohr§tien; Marcel, ed. Gilson, 
42-43.) 
27 Du Refus, 34. 
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is in fact simply a prolongation of my experience of myself. 28 
Beyond even this area of what 1s mine, everything that exists is 
in an anAlogous relation to th2,t which binds me to my body and 
roy possessions, fI.nd it is just the mysterious ::md intimate char-
a.cter of the latter which colors every existential judgement: 
••• moi ayant oonscienoe de mon oorps, ctest-a-dire le 
saisissant A 18 fois comme objet (corps) et COI1E"le non-objet ._~ 
(mon corps) voilA par rapport ~ quoi se d'flnit toute 
existence. Afflrmer l'ex1stence d'un ~tre ou dtnne chose 
quelconque, oe serait en somme dire: oet ~tre ou oette 
chose est de m~me nature que mon oo~ps et appart1ent au 
merne monde; seu1ement cetta homog~n~i te porte sans a.oute 
moins sur l'essenoe (objective) que sur l'intimlte envel-
oppee dans 1e mot mien, mon corps.29 
--
It is interesting to note in the progress of l'.e.arcel' s 
thought as he freed himself more and more from his idee,list form-
ation and terminology the development, indeed, the transforruntion 
of his notion of existence. In his earlier years he had so fta' 
identified existence with objectivity that he believed thc.t one 
could not say that God exists without converting God into an 
ob jeot .30 Later, however, a.lthough there is no chflnee in Marcel t 
28 Ibid., 120-121. 
-
29 JOUIT.k~ ~~tapAlsi~~, 305; cf. 261, 265; Bein~ 
~ Havins. 9-'2. 
30 Journal M~taphysi9.ue, 156s "Existenoe et pr&dica-
tion. N'existe que oe qUi peut ~tre objet de pr6dioation. oe qui 
peut ~tre rep~r~ (pour ~mettre un jugement d'existence, 11 faut 
rep~rer PE~ pr~dicats). Dtod une relation tr~s nette entre le 
feit qutil n'y a pas de sens A dire que Dieu existe et l'impossi-
bilit~ de lui attribuer des CBrAoteres. de 1e convertir en lui." 
(Entry of December 14, 1918.) ---
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idea of objeotivity, existence takes on [" new meaning for him.31 
In reality, existence can never be dissociated from existing 
things. 32 It is neither posit;ed nor conceived nor oharHcterilr.a.-
ble. Rather, existence oen only be recognized as a pure immedi-
ate and 8.S Fl partiCipation. Still later when Mflroel is strugglinl 
to see the relation between being and existing. he adds that 
there OFill be no idea of existenoe strictly speaking, beoause ex-
istenoe 1s the very limit or the ax1s of reference for thought 
/ 
itself.33 As thought, too, 1s £; mode of existenoe, 1t is within 
existenoe and as suoh cannot ref1J.ly go beyond it. But it is the 
speoiel privilege of thought that it oan in a. me[-;sure clbstraot 
from existenoe for strictly limited purposes. Howevel:', insofoI 
as thoUfsht is aooompanied by knowledge and returns to being, the 
abstraotion is reoognized for what it 1s @nd thought is egain 
existenti8,l.34 
Now, let us return onoe again to the oonsciousness of 
the self as existing. Att~he level at which we have exemined 
this experience, which properly speaking has been the level of 
phenomenology a.nd not of ontoloeYt we have been concerned only 
31 Ibid. t 309-329. (An appended essay entitled "Existr-
ence at objectiVrte.") 
32 Ibid., 304. 
-
33 Bein,6 ~ Havins, 38. 
34 Ibid., 27. 
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With exi:31ienoe ps enoountered in everyday experience and not wit 
an absolute existence on 'which all other existents depend. 35 Ho '-
ever, we can probe more deeply into this experience D.nd see what 
further it itnplies of ontol06icEl value. When I reflect on the 
fret of my incarnation and on my situation in the vlorld, 1 con 
set up a dualism between the self as thinkine; and willing and th 
absolutely contingent empirical self. However, et the same time 
I can go beyond this dualism in a reouperative second reflection 
/' 
which is a personsl and free act of thought. where I recog:nize 
that I can no more place my situation in the world in quest;ion 
than I can place myself in question. fmd where the e.pparent dua.l 
ism is united in a. rapport that is non-contingent, i.e., that is 
jot empirically determined. 36 Both myself and my Situation, as 
well as my thinking and empirical self. are imrnediately present 
to me. Thus I recognize that my situation does not depend on me 
but. on the contrary, I depend on it. My situation transcends 
me, but while it is true that I depend on it, it is not imposed 
on me. Hather, it is present to me and open to rrry free aoceptDn e 
and ratification. This 1s to say that interiorly I can either 
accept or reject it. And it is just at this point that I make 
F; choice ,'klioh cO~lsti tutes me as [J per;30nor whioh denies my 
very being: 
35 ~stery E! Bei~. 89. 
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La pOint de d~part dtune philosophie authentique--at 
j'entends par l~ une philosophie qui est lfexp~rienoe trans-
mu~e en pens~e, o'est; cependant IB reoonnnis:Jance cussi 
luo1de que possible de cette situation paradoxf',le qui non 
seulement est Ie mienne, mais me fElit moi. Je rappelle 
enoore cepende,nt que cette situa"~;ion, si-radioale snit-
elle--et personne ne mettra jamsis 1 f 8,ccent plu::; fortement 
que moi sur le. valeur u~t1me dtune certain ecceite--, ne 
se laisse saisir que par rapport A une liberte qui est 
dtabord et avpn~7tout le pouvoir de s'$ffirmer ou de se 
nier el1e-m~me. 
For V'.nen I ohoose to aooept B.nd open IiJyself to that whioh is be-
yond me I affirm that my personal 81 tuation cay!. ht,ve its founda-
tion only in a personal and tri .. nscendent Absolute who has freely 
~\'illed both me and my 51 tuation 1n an at emporal and sovereign 
[ ct, and I am thus no longer simply €t contingent fact, but a 1>er-
~ willed by God. 3S In so relating my oonorete s1-t;uat1on to the 
God who hee willed me I reoognize fully my own status as oreature 
As my own being 1s present to me with the being of others, it is 
not possible for me to possess my proper being without possess-
ing the others and God, while, inversely, the presence of others 
is the condi t10n of my true 'presence to myself • 
. Strictly speaking, it is not from an Hct of thought 
that this affirmation procedes, but nc:.ther from an f:ot of fC'i1th,3 
involving the free and personal engagement of my v,hole being. 
37 ~ ~efus, 39-40. 
38 Journal !Letaphysisue, 6. 
39 "Theism and Personal Rele.t1onships, ff Cross Ourrents 
...;;..... ........ ----NeVi York, I, No.1, Fall, 1950, 37. 
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ItL'esprit ••• ne se cr~e comme esprit que par la foi en Dieu."4( 
This is to say that my spiritual personality is constituted in 
the unique and oriBin€tl relation established bet\>:een myself and 
God by my personal free aot of faith. Freedom is at the cross-
roed of tlle "I exist" and the "I believe."41 It is to be noted, 
hOl':aver J that ,Me.Tcel does not concei va of freedom as simply being 
an agonizing power of alternatives, of the option bet1';een affirma-
tion or denial. Reis more positive in his aru?,lysis, seeing in 
liberty the joyous response to a freeing /call or invocation. 42 
We have arrived f!,t a pOint t"ihich has perhaps been the 
central conoern of Marcel's philosophical research. the act of 
faith. It was from the observance of this experience, in others 
first more than himself, that he seems originally to have become 
dissFtt1sfied with the systems of thought in which he had been 
formed. It continued to engage him as he realized more and more 
its religious significance. and after his own conversion to 
Catholicism it revealed new depths. As we have already indicated l 
Y:larcel remains on the philosophical level of' discourse. Never-
theless, by the very orientetion of his thought, he sees a con-
crete philosophy pS necessarily open to Revelation fmd, in a 
40 
41 
Journ01 Metaphysisu~, 46. 
R1coeux, }~ercel II JHs12ers. 221. 
42 Ibid., 224 .... 225; ef. Mercel, .:Q!! Hefu8, 
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sense, requirine it for the full understanding of the actual 
!human condition. 
Equally central to f.t1aroel' s thought, hov/ever, 1s the 
human experience of love wh10h stands beside faith in value e.nd 
sublim1ty. Indeed, the two cannot be dissociHted: 
Par Itt se trouve pos~ tt cat~ de l£{ foi 1 t amour. J t a1 
dit ailleurs que 1 t amou:r est le cond1tion de 1a foi, et en 
un sens, ce1a est vra1. Meis ce n'est 1t> qufun aspect. Je 
orois quten r~a11t' l'amour et 18 foi ne peuvent et ne 
d01vent pas @tre d1ssoc1es. Ilorsque le) f01 cesse dt@tre 
amour, el1e se fige en une croyancepbjective ~ une puis-
sance plus ou mo1ns phys1quement conQue; et d'autre part, 
l' elllour qu1 n t est pas 1s f01 (et qui ne pose pas In trans-
cendance du D1eu a1me) n'est qutune sorte de jeu abstI'a1t. 
De mIme qu'A 1a f01 oorrespond 1a rea11te d1Vine (qui ne 
peut @tI'e pens~e autrement quten fonotion d'elle), de mIme 
A 1 t amour oorrespond 18 perfeotion d1v1ne. Nt l'un1te de 
1a rea11t~ et de 18 perfeotion en Dieu, bien loin de dev01r 
8tre entendue au sens des vieux 1nte1lectualistes (ens 
rea1isaimum) ne peut se comprendre quten ionction de 1 t un1t& 
de 10 f01 et de 1 t amour sur laque1le je viens d t 1nsister. 
Je oease de oroire en Dieu ~ p~rtir du moment au je cesse 
de l'aimsI'; un Dieu 1mparl'e.it ne peut ~tre r~e1.43 
43 Journal M{,ts'PUvsiQue. 58. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE 0]1 LOVE IN A CONCRET:E: })HILOSOPHY OF EXISTING 
A. ~ Triadic ~ !?ladic Relatior,t.~ of ~~ 
There is in rea.lity a triadio relation in a.ny dialogue 
between two persons. There is the person speaking, the I; the 
-
person spoken to, ·the ~; and the ob jeQ:t of the dialogue, the 
He or It.1 It makes no difference if the dialogue is wholly in-
- -
terior, fl.S, for example, when + am interrogating myself about 
some action I performed. The three-fold relation is still pre-
sent. Implicitly or explicitly I proceed by a dialeotio of ques-
tions and answers, a process which is essentially infonnative, 
serving either (1) to instruct someone else about myself or about 
a third thing, (2) to instruct myself about myself, or (3) to 
lea:rn. from another about himself or some ot.her. In any case and 
at any instanoe in the discourse a judgement is brought to bear 
on the object of the discourse, whioh is nlwFYs considered as 
something exterior to the dialogue itself and independent of it: 
1 Journal Mbtap!'Ssique, 145. 
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De m~me, lorsque je parle de quelqufun A ls tr01si~me per-
sonne, je le traite comma 1nd~pend(mt--eomme sbsent--comrne 
s~pa.r~; plus exactement je le dAfinis implic1ternent comme 
exterieur A un dialogue en cours qui :peut @tre un dialo{:,"Ue 
avec moi-m@me. 2 
But to judge is to olassify. To judee an individuf),l eXf'otly is 
to classify him correctly, that is, to establish him in certain 
common categories in such a way that €:l. oontinual reVision of the 
initial classifioation will not be neoessary. As such, the judge 
ment has no ontological value, since it bears essentially on a 
third person, an object,' that which is able to be placed in a 
oategory.' Thust to consider someone as 8!l aggregate of qualitie 
whioh c(';u be predioated of him is to treat him as an object, as a 
third person, as not present. 
On the other hand, when I treat another as (i whole and 
as transcending the order of questions and ansv.ers, I establish 
a relation or a bond between us which admits of no third person. 
!p'he rapport is here dyadio. and expresses f1 true pert1oi:pation of 
friendship or love.4 The passage from pure dialectio to love is 
made in so far as a person beoomes more and more profoundly a 
Thou for me. In reality, e.t a first meetinB the other is essen-
-
ti811y a!!!, having only t;he form, so to speak, of a~. We 
appear to eaoh other (and to ourselves) as "a such fl or "8 such 
2 ~., 137. 
3 Ibid •• 161-162. 
.. 1'81(1., 155. 
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other." But the more the other becomes a presenc.E!, a. spiritual 
co-esse,5 to me and not just an object, the less he can be char-
--
acterized ~'lS a "suoh." The beloved is ;:~s little as possible a 
third person for me. At the same time he reveals me to myself', 
since the efficacy of his presenoe is such that I am less and 
less a third person for myself. 6 
• " • plus il stagit de oe que je suis comma totalit~ (at 
non de ca que j'ai) plus la ~eponse at la question m@me 
perdent toute sign1fioa<tion. Of 
Between the two subjeots of love. then, there is no intermedie"ry. 
Love is essentially conoerned with what is present and present in 
its totality. In love alone the individuelity of the beloved is 
not dispersed or broken up into innumerHble abstrAot elements, 
and it is in this sense tha.t only love can be called H true know-
ledge.a Whet is l~olly real,9 and it is to this that love is 
direoted, 1s beyond all explication and ell reduction. 10 He who 
5 Of. ?hilosoph~ of ~ence. 25. 
6 ~purnal M~taphYs~, 145-146. 
7 ~., 152. 
a .!E!2.-, 63. 
9 Ib1d., 64 c "L t amour ne s t adresse don c pas a. oe qui 
l'aime est en-soI s1 par ce qui est en soi on entend une essence. 
Tout au contruire. Ltamour porte sur oe qui est au del! de l'es-
sence, jtai dit dAjA que l'amour est l'acte par lequel une pensAe 
se :fait libre en pensant une 11berte. Ltpmour en ce sens va I:.1U 
delA de tout jugement possible, car le jugement ne peut porter 
que sur l'essenoe; et ltemour est ls nbgation m@me de l'essence." 
10 Ibid •• 6'3 .. 
loves passes beyond a.ll judgemen'ts which classify the beloved, 
beyond the level of objeotive knowledge which can only ignore 
\VnCit is transcendent: "Et par Ill. 1 t amour est 1H n~gation de Is 
connaissance.»11 
If love is forbidden to judge, however, it is not nec-
essarily blind. Love cannot knowinely dissociate itself from 
IDlowledge and still remain love. It would beoome lost in 11lu-
siont 
Ltamour doit s'apparaitre A lu1-m~llle oomma una connn1ssanoe 
parfait, et. dans la m~sura o~ 11 n'est plus legitime de 
dissoc1e 1c1 l' !tre de 1 t appc~ra!tre, on peut dire qu' i1 
~ une oonnaissanoe parfait. 12 
In reflection, however, love is seen to be distinct from know-
ledge and able to be defined as being beyond all know1edge. 13 
It is. nevertheless, true that BS the lover is a thinking subject 
he cannot i''ihol1y abstain from judging the beloved, but only in 
11 Ibid. 
-
12 Ibid. We must be careful, however, how we under-
stand Maroel's-sti'tements on love as a kind of knmvledge~ His 
qualifying words are important, for Marcel 1s I1wpre that the aot 
of love 1s not the act of knowledBe, not even of intuitional know-
ledge; but he is aleo aware that it is the whole man who a.ets. 
It is the proper chare,cter of love never -to become a mode of see .... 
ing. Thus, there is no question of an 1ntu1tionism of love. (Of. 
R1coeur, Marcel et Jas~rs, 83",) Love 1tself, as an experience 
of transcenaence-;-rema a-on this side of sight, and its inten-
tion, as that of faith or hope, is revealed and its transcendent 
signifioance manifested in the properly intellectual aot of seo-
ond reflection. 
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so far r~s the beloved is the object of thought. In the measure 
in which the beloved is the object of love (which strictly speak-
j.ng converts him from an object to a subject) no judgement can be 
made. One of the most important metaphysical formulas, notes 
]'.8Xoel fifteen years before his conversion, is the Christian dic-
tum, "Thou shE:lt not judge, ft14 
, Love holds its privileged position of transcending 
judgement becfJ.use it has received in itself the medietion of the 
divine. 15 God, who is the absolute Thou; is inaccessible to ob-
jective fu"lowledge, and He ·wholly escapes judgement. Any objecti-
vation concerning God is a falsification; "Quand nous parlons 
de Dieu, sachons bien que cen' est pf".S de-Die'll que noue parlons. If 6 
- -
In so far as oreatures participate in God, in so far .c.tS they are 
present to each other as ,Thou t s rather t han ~, they, too tare 
transcendent and escape judgement: 
11 faut, je crois, partir de l'impossibilit6 o~ est 
lfamant de juger It@tre aime et se demander A quelles con-
ditions elle tient. tr'EAi d~jA dit que lte.mour qui s'inter" 
di t toute r~flexion est celui qui a. subi ll:~ mediation du 
divin. C'est-A-dire que atest bien en tant que l'~tre Gime 
est pense oomne participant A ~eu qulil est p1ao~ dans 
cet ordre transcendant par rr:pport A tout jugement, qu' 11 
est conqu comme valeur absolue. Ou plut8t (ceoi pour ex· 
clure toute interpretation psyohologiste) la justifioation 
14 ~., 64-65. 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid •• 158. 
-
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de 1 t pcte par lequel est rffirm~e oette txa-fi.scendance de la 
crllature consiste dans celu1 qui pastule sa. filiation divine~17 
Therefore t }'Jarcel concludes, really to love another is to love 
him in God. 18 
~1ust we say then that love speaks only in the seoond 
person, while judgement is limited to the third? In a sense, yes, 
I can, fo~ example, say to someone I love, "You are good." Now, 
\'I;n11e such a judgement does not express the same impersonal Chftr-
ecter whioh it would if it were made in t.he third person, it does 
carry with it references to a purely objective judgement. If my 
judgement, "You are or you [:lre not such a quality," is intended 
to inform you of something about yourself, it is because I be ... 
lieve there is something about you which you have not (at least 
virtually) asked yourself and that, therefore, there is some-
thine in you which is of the -third person, an object, for your-
self. On the other hand, if I intend the judgement to inform you 
about myself, i.e., that I believe you are such a quality, it is 
because I consider that there is something of the third person 
in me for you. If absolute love were present this element of the 
third person \!1.ould be wholly 2bsent, 'There would only be· I and 
Thou. 19 OonsequentlYt in i;he measure in which a judgement in the 
17 Ibid., 66. 
-
18 ill!!., 158. 
19 Ibid., 156-157. 
-
r 
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second person is informative, it remains in the register of the 
third person. But in so far as it is f: movement of love • it S ob-
jeotive oontent is of little i~portsnce.20 
In the preoeding chapter we said that the spiritual per-
sonality was truly oonstituted in the free aot of faith in God, 
and also indicated the interdependence of faith PYld love. Love 
also, then, will have a function similar to faith in the oreation 
of the spiritual person. In order to affirm myself a.s e person, 
," 
I must have present to me e 1hm! which is an absolute value in 
itself, that is to say, an end in itself. which 08.n only be a 
person. I affirm myself as 1. therfore, only in renouncing my-
self, in affil.1ning the value of others-thaD-myself. The creation 
of the self as a person and the clea:tion of absolute values is 
thus a. simultaneous double creation of love. Refleotion dis-
covers the harmony between two absolute and, at first Sight, 
mutually exo1usive affirmations. Of itself, love creates. When 
it stops creating in order to refleot on itself, it oeases to be 
love, oeases to be the highest approxime.tion of being, for to 
create is to go beyond the plane of objeotivation in order to 
enter into the sphere of being. Not to recognize that love is 
distinot from and beyond knowledge is "to deny it as love. ~;hen 
first refleotion discovers that there is nothing objectively 
Maroel, 
20 Troisfontaines,r;xistential1sme Qh!etient Gabriel 
ed. Gilson, 239. 
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there where love h,ps created a ~ ~ ~, an~, it is tempted 
to condemn this creation as something false and devoid of' onto-
logical value. But in reality there is Em Us when love creates 
-
it, and second reflection, denying the objective reductions of 
the first, tiill recognize the properly ontological value of love, 
area,tor of the personalities of the Thou and fJe, because oreator 
- -
of the~. Once the limits of first reflection are passed, secon< 
refleotion allovvs room for liberty and creative love. 21 
/ 
In oreating the very thing that it knows, love dis-
penses its own privileged knowledge,22 which, while not an ade-
quate knowlede;e in the objective sense, is e, knowledge of itself 
as acting. This is to say tha.t love cannot be truly knovm as 
love apart from the act of lnving, for I can only correctly think 
of an act as an Ect if I refuse to objectify and immobilize it. 
It is in this sense that a personality must be considered poster-
ior to the act whioh constitutes it. "L'amour cree l'amant en 
t~mt qu' amant. "23 
21 Troisfontailles, Exlstentlalisme Chretien, 242-243; 
Cf. n. 1. This paragraph is taKen from" a-resume Biven by Pere 
Troisfont~dnes of a very long and abstract dialectic included in 
an unedited notebook of Narcel's, which bears the title, Notes 
;2hilosoph19,ues personne~, 191,-1914. 
22 Journal M~taphysigue, 216. 
23 froisfontaines, Bxistentia11sme Chrbtien, 245-246. 
From another unedited notebook entitled Notes aa '9B~-1913: 
"Ponr tE. th~se .. ft _. 
,.. 
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Ra1s1ne a metaphysic[;!.l question. M~;~rcel asks: If love 
does not bear on an objeot, on ~ln .!~, can we conolude that it 
bears on what we can cell the non-It? Vihile it might be agreed 
--
that the tra.nsvaluation whioh is at the base of love corresponds 
to a. real transformation in the lover, is there necessf"Iily a 
oorrelative modifioation in the beloved? Metaph.ysically, the 
problem can be broken down as folloyg,: (1) Does love benr on 
being a.nd not simply the idea of being? (2) Oan it beHr on the 
being without affecting the beingr( Having advanoed to Cl position 
of realism by this time (these notes were made in December, 
1919) ,24 Marcel dismisses the first question as one about mioh 
doubt is no longer possible, However, later, and in another con-
text, Marcel again poses the question, although in a slightly 
different form: 
When I treat another as a Thou and no longer as a He 
does this differenoe of treetment qualify me a.lone and my 
f~tti tude to this other, or can I say that by treating him 
as a Thou I pierce more deeply into him and Hpprehend his 
being or his essenoe more directly?25 
To answer the question thus posed, Mexcel first notes that essenCE 
may be understood either as a nature or as A freedom. As nature 
the other appears to be identical with whe.t I am 9:'Ua nature, and 
in so npprehending him I treat him ('$ a .!!£ and enclose him in c. 
24 Journal M~taEhls1sue, 217-218. 
25 Being ~ Havins, 106. 
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cirole within myself where the other becomes the idea of the 
other. The idea of the other is no lonc;er the other sua other, 
but the other fj.S identioal with myself. The other remains truly 
other in his essenoe ~ua freedom, Emd 1 t 1s thus thHt I apprehend 
him when I treat h1m BS a ~.26 Further, it is to be noted 
that it is in h1s essenoe Sua freedom that the other can be af-
firmed as existing, for it is in this tht:,t he is other: 
Not only do \tve have a right to assert thBt others exist 
but I should be inolined to oontend/that existenoe oan be 
attributed only to others, and in virtue of their otherness, 
and that I oannot think of myself as existing except in so 
far as I oonoeive of myself as not being the others: and so 
as other than them. I would go so f?T as to say t~qt it is 
of the essenoe of the Other that he exists. I oannot think 
of h1m f:.S other without thinkinB of him ~1.S existing. Doubt 
only arises when his otherness is, so to say, expunged from 
my mind. 27 
Regarding Maroel' s seoond question, a preliminflry con-
siderntlon makes olear thc:.t the beloved is certEdnly not empiri-
oally mOdified by the love he inspires, and thXlt included in the 
total re81ity of each of us ere the sentiments we inspire in 
others. Now, loan certainly think of my OMt love as ~ attain-
in~ the being! love, but this is to treat us as distinot, as 
separnted, by treatlnB myself in some way as fl third person be-
tween us. But this is a love Vihich excludes faith. Aotually 
my love can exeroise an action on the beloved only in so far as 
26 ~'t 106-107. 
27 ~., 104. 
this love is not desire. In desire I tend to subordinate the 
beloved to my o'V'm etlds, and losir...g sight of his absolute v&lue, 
I relegate him to the place of an object. 28 Consequently, in 
considering another E'S a. ~ or a Thou, it is not siI:nply 8. dis-
tinction br:sed on different mentfl1 attitudes. There is, on the 
contrer,y, a metaphysical validity to the distincti.on, since it 
is only as Thou that the other truly exists for me and hi~) free-
-
dom in rel.!}tion to me respected and assured. 29 Perhaps. there-
~. 
fore, only completely disinterested love, love free from all 
traces of desire, is able to affect the Thou; "et cette remarq~e 
projetterait quelque lumi~re sur 1a fonction pratique de la 
saintete. fl30 
B. ;Havins ~ Being 
We have said that love affeots being in the measure in 
which this movement is not desire. As opposed to love, desire 
remains on the pl[;11e of having t ymich is identic8l with the realm 
of the problematic. 31 What is the significance of this nevI dis-
tinction or opposition? Let us follow Marcel in his 6.nalysis of 
28 Journal M~taphls!S~' 218. 
29 Being ~ Having, 106-107. 
30 Journal Metaphli~19.ueJ 218. 
31 Be1n3 ~ Havin~t 166, 172. 
the no·tion of having,32 which seems to carry V'ith it two refer-
ences, having"'Ea-posses;;;~ing and heving-ps-implicption. In the 
former reference there is a certain :!uid relating to a certain 
sui who is treated HB a oenter of' inherence or apprehension. 33 
The !lui, however, is always impliCitly recognized as being on a 
higher level than the Suid. The movement of havine takes place 
v..'ithin the gUi although it is externalized in the actual posses-
sion of the ~ui~. Thus, 
We oan only express ourselves in terms of havine when we Core 
movine; on a level where, in vi,rhatever manner and whatever de-
gree of transposition. the Qontrast between within and 
wi thout retai ns CI mecming. 34 
Now, when we consider the reference to having-sa-impli-
cation, as when we SFiY thAt a certa.in body ha,s a certain proper-
ty, the movement of having takes place and remains within the 
9,ui, but even in this case the quid characterizes the qui while 
remaining wholly other than it. 
And. now we see the trEi.rlsi tion take place from the first 
formula to the second one: we can only express ourselves in 
terms of having, r:hen V'.e are moving on a level implying 
reference to another taken as fmother" " " , The statement 
32 The development of this notion is tt:1ken chiefly 
from a paper delivered to the !Jyons Philosoph1cHl SOCiety in 
November, 1933, entitled "Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having,tf 
included in Beine and Havin~, 154-175. 
33 Beine:!E!! Having, 158. 
34 ~., 160. 
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"I heve" can only be made over against another which is 
felt to be other. 3S 
A chara.cteristio note of Bll possession is its being 
able to be shovm or displayed. Thus, a seoret the.t is possessed 
is only a. seoret as long DS it is kept, but at the same time it 1 
a secret only beoause it can be revealed.'6 .As knowledge is some 
thing that is essentially communicable it, too, 1s a mode of 
having.'fl 
At the basis of every form of'having there is e. tension 
beti-'\'een the self and the other, a tension oaused by the very fact 
that the other remains wholly other no IDF.:ltter how interiorized 
the possession is. As sepa.rate from the self, the other, the 
sui~J has its own proper permanenoy and power whioh the self trie 
desperately to suppress for its ovm ends. B'lt, paradoxiccl.lly, 
the more one is conoerned with the mastery over others or things, 
the more he becomes enslaved to them. 38 This is particularly 
clear in the case of my posses8ion of my body. In frct, when I 
consider My body solely as an instrument over which I heve com-
plete oontrol. I am expressing the archetype of' all forms of 
35 ~.t 161. 
36 ~ •• 160-161. 
37 Ibid., 145. 
38 Ibid •• 162-164. 
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having. 39 The more, then, I treat my body &s somethiYlg distinct 
from myself but at the same time as H possession to which I am 
ptteched, the more it tyrannizes over me and destroys me by sub-
merging me in this body to which I olinG_ 
So that in the last an::~lysis--and this is a new point 
of vie-w--HaVing as such seems to have a tendency to destroy 
8.11.d lose itself in the very thing it began by l)OSsessing. 
but which now absorbs the master V'iho thought he controlled 
it. It seems thEt it is of the veTiJ nature of my body, or 
of my instruments in so fe.r as I trea.t them as possessions, 
that they should tend to blot me out, althoueh it is I who 
possess them. 40 / 
However. in the measure in which our posses~:iions serve 
as the immediate subject matter of a personal oreative act, a.s 
in the cases of the musician's instrument, the gardener's tool, 
or the philosopher's thoughts, havine tends to be sublimated and 
trr::nsformed into being. 
We may nOVJ be in a better position to understand the 
differenoe in the directions taken by desire and by love. Re-
maining on the level of havirlg, desire is oentered either on 
oneself or on another as other. t';'hile appearing to be hetero-
centriC, it is really autocentrio41 in that it seeks to oenter 
its objeot in itself. .As JRcques 'Meritain snys in desoribing 
the movement of desires 
39 Of. MysteJ:'Y 2f Being, 97. 
40 t'ei~!!ES! Havint,;;t 164-165. 
41 !!?!i., 167. 
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I have a tendency or affective overflow towards that 
object which I will beoause it is good for me, and I pro-
duoe in myself, as it were, a spi!'i tun.l weigh': which drt-::ws 
me towards it thnt I may inoorporate it into myself, that 
it may be ~.42 
But in love, on the other hand: 
I have a tendency or affective overflow, towards this object 
to which I will good because it is good, and I produce in 
myself a spiritual weight, or impulse, by which I draw all 
things and myself to this other being which for me becomes 
an ~~' a subject, and to which I wish to be in some way 
or ot er rea.lly united, as to myself. 43 
Love, then, is the life v''ihich 1s deoente;:ed, which ohanges oen ... 
ter. 44 
Love moves on a ground which is neither that of' the self, 
nor that of the other s.ua other; I call it the 'rhou. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Love, in so fa.r as distinct from desire or as opposed 
to desire, love treated as the subordination of the self 
to a superior rea.lity. a reality s:t my deepest level more 
truly me than I am myself--love as the breaking of the 
tension between the self and the other, apperu's to me to 
'be wha.t one might oall the essential ontologioF;l dntum.45 
The world of having is that of the other as other, while the 
world of being is th8t where the tension between the self and 
the other as other 1s abolished in a single living reE1lity. 
42 Jacques Maritain, Prefaoe 12. fi1etaphysios. New York, 
1939, 72. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Marcel, Journal ~~~tep!\ysi9.ue, 217. 
45 Being and Havin~, 167. k1d MErcel adds: "I think 
and will S8Y 80 by t1i:'e"way, t:et the soienoe of ontology will 
not Bet out of the soholastio rut until it takes full cognisanoe 
of the fact that love comes first." 
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We think of our possessions [;s things of whioh we have 
~he risht to dispose. But if \\e consider the notion of disposi-
pility from the point of view of the subject, vve see th;,~t having 
.LS essent1.!dly bound up with the self, it is fin anxious self'-pre-
::>ccupation. Thus. when I am with someone who is 8. non-dispos1ble 
person, I a.m aware thBt I am with someone for whom I do not 
~xist.46 On the other hand, oherity and love admit of' absolute 
diSposibility.47 The person who loves totally co~nits his whole 
Reine. to the Ofn'e of another. A complete oommi tment is only 
possible before God, however, who Alone hoa the right of absolute 
dispospl. In the measure in which E'. person oommits himself'. that 
~s to say, sacrifices his own being. so fc~ does being assert its 
transoendency over having. "There lies the deepest significanoe 
of martyrdom oonsidered E\S witness: it II w1tness. fl48 
While self-love regarded /",5 non-disposable is a denial 
Iof being, self-love IDI'W also be regc1rded as disposable, that is, 
[the love of whe.t God may make of me. 49 Thus, the creE:ture 
46 Ibid., 72-73. 
-
47 ~., 69. 
48 Ibid •• 84; cf. ibid., 127: " .... the soul 
essentially deulcated is iPi0TaCto the most disposable. 
soul wills itself to be an nsirumerlt; but S11icioe is the 
denying oneta-self' as an instrument." 
49 Ibid., 69. 
-
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knowing t;h:""~: Whatever is positive t'Jithin him is derived from God, 
knows that in disreg(,-3rding himself he is disp,,~r8ging God f s gift. 
Not to Hcknowledge one's value as dexi ved from God is a radicf',l 
perversion resul tine from the crer)ture t s approprie:l,ting rights to 
himself which in fDct belong only to God. 50 True charity towards 
oneself oonsists in regardine; oneself, not ['s self-sui':ficient, 
but as a seed or a clumnel for spiritual Efld divine goods to flow 
into the world. 51 
In detaching itself more Emd more from having, the 
spirit makes itself disposible for being. It is the same dia-
lectical movement that turns the spiri 1; from problem to myst;erj t 
from He to 'rhout from objective l{"rlowledge to Love. 
o. Su.mma.rl 
We have attempted in these last two chR.pters to present 
the philosophical views of' Gabrielr.~Rrcel, dwelling pnrticularl;y 
on those aspects of his thought which would lead 'to an under-
standing of' the rale played by love in a Christian philosophy of 
existing. We regret the necessity of completely passing over or 
merely alluding to many other facets of r':eIcel' s philosophy whioh 
ofIer profound and bec.utiful ins1.ghts into the nature of human 
50 Ibid., 88-91 n. 
51 ~ Refust 65-66. 
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experience. However. accepting the limitations imposed by our 
purpose, we will restrict our summary even more to those points 
which will elucidate the more properly metaphysical va.lue of 
Marcel's thought. 
While Marcel on several occa.sions concerns himself Ii'!i th 
questions pertaining to the order of being 8.S such, this is not 
the natural habitat of his own original speCUlations. Remaining 
true to his inspira.tion, lliiarcel returns immediately t 0 the realm 
..-
of the concrete existent. However, the conclusions arrived at 
on this level do have their metaphysioal significance: • • • 
plus nous seurons reconna!tre It@tre individuel en tant que tel, 
plus nous serons orlent~s et comme achemin~s vel'S Q~e saisie de 
Itetre en tant qut~tre."52 
Now, a fundamental problem for Marcel, and one to which 
he returns time and time again, is to show the ontological bear-
ing of' the several ex.periences which he descxibes end analyzes. 
Annexed to this problem is his desire to avoid subjectivism while 
denying the position of pure objectivity. Rejecting the validity 
of the If:tter dilemma, Marcel attests the prirnFcy and trr;nscend-
ency of being and establishes it in the order of the meta-prob-
lematio or mystery, which is not merely a denial of objectivity 
but is rather a positive affirmation of its intelligibility in 
itself. There is no fundament81 obscurity in the world. The 
52 Ibid". 193. 
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apparent obsourity is due to the mysterious nature of the link 
uniting the self to the body, through whioh we have immediate 
oontaot with other things. 
But in a oonorete philosophy based on experience, the 
attestation of being oannot be justified by a simple desoription 
of the psyohologioal sta.tes oonditioninB the affirmation. It is 
neOess8Iy to justify it in terms of a deeper and ontologioally 
valid d~marohe bear1ng on the speoific intentionality of the af-
firmation itself. The global experience of existenoe which is 
given in the awareness of the self's existence affords the basiS 
for this affirmation, which is made explioit in refleotion. But 
the authentic affirmation, the true clttestation of being, oan 
only be made at the lev'el where the antinomy between the sub jeot 
and, the objeot is transoended, whioh is to say that the antinomy 
is dissolved in a real partiolpE"tion in being. 
This is the sphere of love, where alone presenoe and 
partioipation, fidelity and invocation, have meaning. Man in his 
situation in the world is oonstantly thre~tened by despairt iso-
lation and betrayal. It is the philosopher's task to open the 
way for m~m to recognize his situation and to engage his whole 
being in constantly renewed efforts to bridge the rupture be-
tween himself and others, " • • • a way whioh is undiscoverable 
except through love, to which alone it is visible."53 
53 J?hiloSQ1)]1v of Existenoe. 2Q. 
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The polarity of the self and the other, which is proper 
~o the sphere of having, is synthesized in the community of per-
sons instituted by the power of love. But the human oowmmity is 
itself a pf;trtioipation in the cc:ritative communion \l\:e seek to 
establish with God, the Absolute Thou, whom we invoke in faith 
~nd prayer. 54 
L'amour. 6prouv~ comme subordination du soi A une r~a11-
t~ sup~r1euret oonstitue de la sorte le donn~e ontolog1que 
essentielle. Seul il s'avere capable d'affronter lt~tre 
sans que oelui-cl se volatllise en avoir, ear seul il est 
epte A transcender la posltion dtune pena6e placbe en faoe 
de l'8utre pour le selair et, du m~me coup, la rbtroveralon 
mortelle par quoi l'autre saisit In pens~e et Ie dissout. 
Une dlelectique pseendante de l'amour, portant A la fois sur 
la rbalit6 et sur l'~tre qui l'apprehende, reconQant ~ tout 
effort pour caract~riser le r6el, mais transformant at 
aurelevant le substance de notre ~tre ecc6dant'ace reel, 
sera Ie ressort d'une ontologie susceptible d'entrer humble-. 
ment dans Ie myst~re du meta-problernatique et, en definitive, 
de potre eXistence.55 
54 Collins, t1Ga,briel Marcel and the .'Mystery of Being,·' 
Thought, XVIII, 681-682. 
55 de Corte, ~~ ?hilosoph1e de ~. !., 39. 
OHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In the whole of Marcel's philosophical writings only a 
comparatively few pages are cfevoted specifically to what might be 
called the metaph~y sioa1 structure of love. Nevertheless, Aimb 
Forest is of the opinion that these represent an important con-
tribution to the recent speculation on the problem of love: 
Le propre de l'amour est dans sa p~nbtration. Son objet 
ntest PBS seulement une id~e, une essence, i1 veut al1er jusquta 1 f 8tre. et dans eette exigence i1 va se distinguer 
du d~3ir. 11 deviant spirituel et d~sint~ressb dans son 
r~a11sme m~me lorsqu t il depasse ce qui est ext~rieur, acci-
dentel pour ohercher l'acces de la plus grande intimite. 
Des remarques de ce genre sont aujourd'hui oomme 1es donnees 
initia1es de toute phi1osophie de 1 t amour. Il faut sans 
doute ohercher leur premiere expression ohez Gabriel Maroel; 
les analysis subti1es du Journal meta~SiqUe eardent pour 
1a pansee d t au j ourd t hU
1
i la valeur pr~c euse-a'une d~couverte 
et d'une orientation. 
Wh11e it would be interesting to ascertflin the exact 
influence of Ma.roel in this field, such a study would be beyond 
the oapabilities of this writer. We would like to oonsider, how-
ever, one or two instances of p.F;rallel lines of thought arnoIlB 
1 A1m~ Forest, "Oonna1ssance et Amour, n Jacg,ues ~­
~ (Revu~ Thomist~), Paris, (no date), 113. 
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oontempora.ry schola.stic T .... ri ters and indicc'!te where Marcel is in 
~,grenment or disagreement. 
Father M~u'tin C. DtArcYt S. J., has recently published 
a notable and erudite work on the historic problem of love of 
self end love of others. 2 Literature, philosop~y, art, and ex-
perience of all times attest the presence of the two directions 
of love in man, the love of the self and the love of' other personf 
and God \'\1. thout regard for self. Both philosophy and theology 
have been concerned to show the difference or identity betvieen 
them, and if they recognized the presence of a. problem due to 
their difference, they attempted to offer a solution of one kind 
or another. Father D'Arcy reviews some of the pOSitions taken, 
and while he himself arrives at the same conclusion as Inc:my of 
his predecessors, he presents the problem and its solution in 
somewhat different terms. 
Man, D'Arcy tells us, is moved by a desire to take and 
to possess everything for himself. but a,t the same time he is 
also inclined to give himself completely, to sacrifice all of 
his own interests and even his life for another.3 These two 
loves in man Are represented by Father D'Aroy as the animus and 
the anima. The animus is masculine, domineering, possessive and 
2 Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J. t ~he r,'!ind end Heart .2f ~, 
New York, 1947. 
3 ~ •• 316. 
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egocentrio. 4 As looking to man's essence, it is represented on 
the spiritual level by the mind, and it seeks the fulfillment of 
man's nRture as man in drawing everything to 1tself, just as in 
knowledge the spirit beoomes enriched in its possession of new 
fonns. The enirof.', on the other hand, is feminine. Its movement 
is one of passiVity, subjeotion and surrender.5 Anima is the selj 
exolusive of reason, but having a specifll reference to the self's 
spiritual aspeot, reaching beyond its own existence to Another 
who gave it eXistence.6 
Man as the subject of both movements experiences the 
tension between the tt"/O, betwe~n the desire to take and the de-
sire to give. If one of the elements dominfltes to the complete 
exclusion of the other~ men is correspondingly false either to 
himself or to his Oreator. The animus itself turns the spirit 
inward and oonsiders everything externnl as Fi means to its o,m 
end. In its extreme manifestations we see the epitome of self-
ishness. vanity and pride. But if the animA is left unfettered 
it, too, carries the soul along to destruction. In the soults 
desire to give itself without regard to reason it tends to plunge 
itself into romemtioism and false mysticism. It seems olear, 
4- ~., 182. 
5 Ibid. 
-
6 ill£! .. , 259. 
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then, that just as the two loves are present in man they must 
be broue;ht in the proper rel~tion to eaoh other. 
Everything is direoted aooording to its nature to oon-
serve itself and to realize its proper form as perfeotly as pos-
sible. Now, in man reason, which is essentially self-regerding, 
is the differentiating aotivity. It is diffioult to see then how 
the other love, the anima, can enter. 
The only answer, the only true harmony ••• must be 
sought in religion--in the oon~uniaa of the anima with its 
divine lover. But even this will fail unless, as in the 
Ohristian religion, the divine lover befriends animus as 
well, and gives.pow~r to the unavailing soul to be led to 
the altar with God;' 
As Gabriel llaroel and others have pointed out, love 
can only be between persons. A human being oan never be a means. 
It is this that is s 19nified when we call him a person t 
When we use the word "person lf we do think of something 
whioh makes a human being his very self in his independenoe 
and Singularity; and pt the same time the word "person" 
seems to imply a rela.tion. In other words, a person is one 
who owns himself and is very muoh an "I", and et the seme 
time, instead of being turned inward in deadly introspection, 
like an idiot, he takes up a position in the world of reali-
ty and is aware of positive relations of equality or depen-
dence or love with one or more other living beings. He ha.s 
both a self-rege-rding love and a disinterested love. As an 
essenoe he is proud, as an existence he is dependent. He i8 
an absolute on a finite scale, a solitary who feels "angst" 
and is full" of grandeur and misere. This is the nemesis of 
a finite personality.~ 
Now, in the light of these notions about person we can understand 
7 Jpid. t 316-317. 
8 Ibid •• 320-321. 
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the self's reaching out to others Bnd to God, not to exploit them 
as he o~n things, but to attend to them for whet they are in them-
selves, other persons, ends in themselves, at the depths of whose 
being there is a region olosed to all save God. Thus, it is be-
cause of the eminent dignity of the beloved, its own intrinsic 
worth, thHt it is even oapa.ble of being so loved. The will of' thE 
lover reaohes its term and finds its appeasement, its joy, in the 
good of the beloved. Recognizing thatAin the relation of persons 
there is a return of love, unequal though it may be, man can no 
longer even ask whether he is ultimately loving himself, for it 
is only in the measure in which he gives his love freely and with ... 
out thought for self that he 8nd his love are I>erfected.9 But 
the self' has his own dignity as a person which he is charged to 
watch over and sefeguard. For this reason seli-love must act as 
eo check on the other love with its tendency to trust itself inde ... 
pendently of reason. Both loves have to be kept straiBht by 
truth, the conformity of the self with its essential nature end 
the order of being to which it belongs. Only in the case of the 
divine love me$ the self drop all its self-reg~rdt and this is so 
only because it knows that from Him oame its being and existenoe 
and in Him is all l11:e. 10 
The essential self is not, indeed, de8d--that oould not be 
9 Ibid., 321-322. 
-
10 Thin .. .,2":1 • .,25 
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so long as a person remains a person--but it is the existen-
tial self, the anima, which goes forth to greet the divine 
lover.11 
It would seem that the tension which Father DtArcy de-
scribes between the a.nimus and the anima is the same as that dis ... 
closed by Marcel in his analysis of having and being. In either 
oase, knowledge and reason are on the side of the animus or hav-
ing. Neither DtArcy nor Marcel, of course, is simply equating 
reason to this possessive drive in man and setting up an absolute 
opposition between knowledge and love. 'No, both are conoerned 
here with what is recognized as a movement of desire in man as 
opposed to a pure. disinterested love, but because of the similar 
direction of reason considered. by itself and its proper activity 
of assimilating its objeot to its own spiritual mode of being, 
knowledge and desire exhibit like characteristics. ~~le for 
Father DtAroy this leads to the problem of the relation between 
love and knowledge, he is able to avoid the position of the vol-
untarists who unheSitatingly assign ,to love and its fac~ty, the 
will, an absolute superiority over knowledge and the intelleot. 
DtArcy does not conoern himself with the problem to any ereat ex-
tent, but in an appendix12 he quotes a number of texts from St. 
11 Ibid., 325. 
-
12 Ibid., 304-307; cf. Pierre Rousselot. S. J., The 
Intellectualisi'iiO'f St. Thomas, trans. J8mes E. Q'Mahony, O.T. 
Oap., New~ York"; 193" 50-60. 
Thomas showing that D. simple unqu~lli:fied choice bet\'veen love and 
knowledge as the superior activity is not possible. A full under .. 
standing of st. Thomas' teaching on the nature of the intellect 
in itself and in m~n and of his theory of knowledge enables FatheI 
Dflrcy to indicate wherein the solution to the problem lies with-
out completely subjugating either man's intel1ect or his \lvill. 
Gabriel Mc;rcel f 01'1 the other herod t takes what c:ppeErs 
to be the volmrtnrist pos1 tion on t~e quest io:~-, although, as has 
been ind5.cated t he sorupulously avoids and condemns any recog-
nized tendency in the direction of irr8.""GioX1£.lism or agnosticism. 
Without desiring to oversimplify Ul8r0el t S profound thought, we 
believe it can be stated that while he seems to perceive the 
beRring of knowledge and attempts to expresS it, he is restricted 
by preconceived notions on the n~lture of 1mowledge and reality. 
fllc-tTcel reoogni zas thDt both knowledge Hna love tJIe 
direoted to the other, although wi-tll different intentions. 13 In 
------. -, 
knowledge, and 1n its voliti.on[i.l counterpa.rt, desire, the subjeot 
c=pprehends the object .flS other thEd1 itself and in ~:? possessive 
movement; seeks to break dovvn this otherness by trt·msform~! .. ng it in 
some ~\'r'y into fl likeness of itself' by bringing it 'within the 
subject's ow:'1 Circle. This, however, is to disparage the 
----.~,<-.-
13 Of. Aima Forest, ~ Structure m~taphysi~u~ du con-
cret selon Saint Thomas dfAruin, Paris, 1931, 301. "Le probIIme 
a:e-l' amour, - o"omme-'''oelui de a connaissanoe, est d t une certain 
fElQon le pl'oblbme de l'autre." 
existentif)l nE',ture of the other, to rob it of its rightful autono-
my, and to deny its being. Love, on the other hand, bears on the 
other as existing and f',utonomous. In its movement of penetration 
and partioipntion love soars above the subject-object opposition 
and finds its fulfillment in oommunion with the other, \"Ihere both 
lover and beloved retain, or more oorrectly, realize their true 
freedom in the recognition of the unique and sacred individuality 
of the other. 
/ 
Now, as Ai~e Forest points out,14 love and knowledge 
[have an inverse orientation. Through knowledge things become 
interior to the soul and are made present to it in their simili-
tude, whioh is not simply an image of' these things, but is rather 
[the means by which the soul possesses them. Thus, knowledge is 
truly an experience of possession, of having in some way. But 
ithe direction of love is quite dif':.ferent. Love seeks to unite 
IUs to others, not in making them ours but in giving ourselves 
over into the reality of the other. Love, then, is more akin to 
an ~'.bHndonment of the self than to a possession. In love the 
subject tends primaril:\:: to perfeot the other, vvhereas in know-
ledge, and in desire, he tends to perfeot himself. 15 
14 "Oonnaissp.nce et ;;:mour," Jfloques &1pritain, 114-115. 
15 Cf. Nlaritain, Preface to Metaphysics, 72-73; and 
8.160 Pierre Rousselot, S. J., Pour l'l}ii~~q~re (tu ;erobl~me 2!. 
ltl:~mour ~ MOYf:.n i'fJe, Munster,1'9Os, 13-14. 
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Thus far there seems to be no disagreement with Niflxcel. 
But can r"J~'l'oel 8dd with Forest that .~,t the term of its effort 
the intelligence El itself places us in the presence of the onto-
lnBical mystery or that knowledge of itself can reveal to us the 
meaning of existence and mys-r;eryy1b It would not seem that M:a-
eel would subse:r'ibe to these statements without at least consid-
erable qualifications. While he has [i. deep oonviotion that the 
intellect seeks more than a. knowled.ge of flbstrB.ct essences, he 
does not seem to be able to situt=!.te knowledge fully and stably 
in the transcendent ordE~r of an~logicel being. 
Perhaps much of whAt has been said in the preceding 
ch£ipters would seem to belie this, but as Nl, de Corte points 
out,11 while Mpreel eertninly manifests a thorough epistemologiea. 
realism, it is not quite so olear that he has arrived at a full 
metl~phys1oal realism. Maroel himself recogni zes his faltering 
stel>s: "Thought turns tOWArds the Other, it is the pursuit of' 
the Other. The whole riddle is to discover whether this Other is 
Being. "18 Nov~', atter thus correctly posing the problem to him-
self, Maroel seeks an answer in distingllishing between thinkin~ 
and thinkin~.2f. In reoognizing that Actual thought is always 
16 "OonnaissarlOe et amour," JaoSl,ues MFl.:ritain, 116. 
11 La Philosophie de G. M..., 13-15; ot. Riooeur, Maroel 
et ![pspers, 354-3;;. - - -
18 Being ~ Havi~BJ 30. 
thought £f somethine other than itself, he affirms the i)'lmf~nence 
of thought in being, and then in a lengthy OlHlysis 19 to 
returns from time to time he returns the question to the episte -
logical level. Instead of considering the ontological formality 
of being as the object of knowledge, he limits the object of kno~­
ledge to the modality of being. ~~en a philosopher's line of 
thought is limited, to the fl'lay in which being exists as an object 
for the mind and fails to note the ontological structure of oein" 
or wha,.! it is in itself, epistemology takes precedence over and 
remains p,pe.rt from metaphysios. There thus mny result a gap 
similar to what WE: find in Maroel between epistemological and 
metaphysical realism. 
This, we say. is the oonclusion to which Maroel is led 
but let us note the more fundamental reasons for his pOSition, 
It will be remembered thDt Marcel reoeived his philosophic train 
ing in the idealism and rationalism of the nineteenth oentury. 
Now, ideelism postu18.'I;es the irreduoible distil'lotion between sub 
ject ana object in both the order of knowledge and the order of 
being (in fpot, if not in intention). Accepting the etymologioa 
definition of the ~erm £bjeot, i.e., ob-jec~um, something thrown 
before or plpoed in the f~?ce of, idealism denies fmy penetrabili y 
of the object by the mind which would dissolve the antinomy by 
19 ..IQ1g. 
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an abstractive process of assimilation. 20 In allooating Hbsolute 
autonomy to the mind and its ideDs, this philosophy ten.ds at the 
same time to an ultra-objectivism and to complete ration6lism. 
And it CBU conclude that "connaitre, c'est construire Ie concret 
en vert'll d'un cl.cte de foi da.ns la stabilit~ et dans Is veracite 
---------
de Itesprit. 1t21 While Mflrcel wes successful in ridding himself 
of most of' the chains forged by idealism, he rebelled also Bgains 
any form of ob jeoti visation, wl'lich he considered to be the 10gic8 
~ 
issue of idealiszn. In effeot, this V":E:.S simply to aocept the 
fundamentF":l postulate of idealism, i.e., the radical opposition 
between subject B.nd object on the plane of knowled.ge. 22 As 
Etienne Gilson has shown so well,23 this is the fate of so meny 
phil(sophers who revolt ageinst a system, but who, in their criti 
oisms as well [:lS in their ovvn positive constructions, unconsoious 
ly aooept either the prinoiples or the method of the philosophy 
"they rejeot. 
To deny to the spirit f1ny possibility of real acces~) to 
other existents is to shut; it up irremed1ally within itself. 
Henoe, MArcel affirms the necessity to reduce or transoend the 
20 de Corte, ~ Philosophie de G. ~'J 47-50. 
21 ~., 50. 
22 ~., 47. 
23 Etienne Gilson, The ¥n§~y £f Philoso~hica~ Experi-
~, New York, 1947, espec1al1~9 - O. 
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opposition between subject and object, but he is unable to effect 
the reduction on the plane of theoretic knowledge. It can only 
be accomplished for him through some kind of' concrete knowledge 
by particip,ntion or connaturali ty. 24 
To say with Marcel that knot/ledge bec>rs on essences is t 
of COlU"'se, true, But it is neither neoessary nor correot to stop 
there. At least two important considerations must follow. First. 
although in the order of' human intelligenoe conoeptual knowledge 
is imperfect, this is not to ssy that it is a falsification of 
real:tty. If it is true that the proper object of the human intel 
lect is the quiddity or the essence of sensible things, it follow. 
that our knowledge bears on essences as they are embodied in con-
crete, particular things, that is, piS they are in reality. liS 
I\~8ritain says,25 if it is a question of experimental knowledge by 
which 'Ie experience the thing in the singu18r and concrete reali-
ty of its presence, then it is very clear that notionel or con-
ceptual YJ'lowledge is not real in this sense. (And, he asks, who 
has ever pretended that; 1 t 1s?) But if' it is a question of f' 
kn.OYyledge whioh enables us to know and understan.o intelligible 
beine truly, that is, in ~-, manner conforming to wh~1t 1s--1ntelli-
gible being, which is Pot the hea:r"t of the real and which 1s 
24 de Corte. ~ Philo~oEhie ~ Q. M., 51. 
25 Jacques Meri tain, ~teflexionf) sur 1 tint elligenoe et 
~ !! ~ EroE~~' 3rd ed., Paris, 1930,-;04=105. --
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capeble of an inexhaustible certitude of itse1f--in this sense, 
and it is this which is important, notiont~l knowledee is real 
knowledge. 
Obviously, what Mp'rcel is trying to arrive at is an ex-
plElnation of truly exi stentip1 knowledge. He sees the inadequf:;-
cies of the pure concept for 0 concrete metaphysics, anc1 he sees 
thet the act of existence is beyond the order of :fo:rm ~mcl essence. 
What he seems to fail to see is how the order of' concepts and the 
.,/ 
order of the judgement, which, epis'),emologically, is the order Ol' 
the act of existence, can be united in a truly scientific and 
philosophical discipline. "Intelligibility appears in two orders 
that of form or essence and that of esse, the act of existence. n2E 
--
A true metaphysios ignores neither but explores the deepest in-
telligibility of whl":t 1s given in the concept in trle light of the 
intelligibility of existence which 1s grasped in the judgement. 
It is thus both concrete and realistic, and 
.. " " its position at the peak of philosophical science is 
clearly validated tor it deals not merely with quiddative 
or form[~l intelligibilities but with the intelligibility of 
that most intimate and ultimete 1'3.CtSJ,. esse, in the lie;ht of 
which it alone considers {-ill things. ,7-
Our second consideration is olosely connected with the 
first. As imperfect 1'1B its mode of kno'\.vledge is, hwmm 
26 Robert J. Henle, S .. J., Method in Metfiphysics, Mil-
~~ukee, 1951, 51. 
27 .!!1:2.. t 58. 
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intelligence oan in a limited way go beyond its proper object and 
<.1'1'i ve at E' knowledge o:f' being in i taelf. Texts Vie ha.ve oi ted 
from Marcel clef,rly indioate that he is fJIVe1'e of this. But here 
the full development of his thought is stifled for two reasons. 
As \-,'e have alrea.dy disoussed, he is first of all handicapped by 
his preconoei ved notions of the nature of knowledge in rels.tion t( 
the known objeot. Seoondly. he seems oompletely unav,are of what 
we mRY oall the world o:f analoey. It is in truth an annlogical 
lmowledge of being in general which we derive ::fl:om the knoj(jledge 
of particular beings, not Simply t as r~nrcel holds J a nega!;i ve 
knowledge. Strictly speaking. Dcoording to this formf,lity 0:1:' 
knowledge the object of intellection is not knov.n in itself. 
r~athert it is refleoted to the mind through its lesser amilogues. 
The world of analogy. whioh 15 properly the sphere of metf'pilysios 
where the highest oauses of :reElli ty are attained by the power of 
abstr;3ction, may indeed be aa.lled trans-intelligible, since it is 
not intelligible to us by experinental knowledge, that is. it is 
not connaturnl to our mode of knowing,,28 
Nevertheless. Mexcel does insist that knovdedge o:f be-
ing can be and. in fact, is attained. If the foregoing 8JlBlys1s 
is oorrect, it; would seem that rlleI'cel t s unde:rstanding of know-
ledge in gener;:;l prevents him from n:t:Tiv1ng at a satisfactory 
---_._-----
28 Jacques M.E;r1tain, The Degrees of y.nowled~e, trarHs. 
Bernard Wall end I;;:argot ldamson, Te\,'':-YOr1<, 1'9)8, ~6a-2 9. 
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explant:ltion of how it is possible. But now let us see what con-
clusions can be draVp.1 from wha,t he tells us specifically about in-
Ituition. 
Intui tj.on for MfiTce1 is clearly opposed to ~my kind of 
Jbstraction. Hc:ther it is like pn intellectual symprhy 'with ::>. 
presenoe. /\3 has bes':1 brought out above t in.tuition is not cEip£~ble 
pf reflecting on itself' or ot' being di::r'ectl;y ret"lected in though t. 
t is on this side of any Vision, but fOS of its nature it tends to 
IVhat is other than i tselt , it i3 ir~medin)ely broken up in a f'irat 
reflection which objectivises the term of the :Lntuition. 28 Hecog-
'liz1ng that an integral objectivation is not possible, n second 
ref1eotion attempts to :r9store the unity of the experience. In a 
i3ingle act refleotion denies itself E~S fm object and affirms its 
",rl::J1scendence over all knowledge and all et> jecti vi ty: 
o test sous Is. forme de la conn8.i:'3sance ob jAoti va que 
1a ref1ex1on pense sa re18tion f.',U monde empirique; e11e est 
savoir d'un mande qui est en lui-m@me stvoir replise; de 
plus, 1 facte de se penser Ie pose pour elle-m~me com .... ne ob-
jet de saveir; meIs elle, dans cat ecta, se nie comma objet 
et affirme sa tnmscendance AI' eeald de toutsavoir at de 
toute objectivite, repoussf:mt comne im"deqlli';te toute repre-
sentation, toute figuration. tOlli,a syrnbolisation d t e11e-
m~me.29 
~ile it cannot be denied that r:r:Hrcel has given us fl new and 
+---------
28 Ma.roel, Journal metaphISi9,ue, 131: "Au fond toute 
r-eflexion, toute difilect!que - e"St"Inv nciblem.ent at'tiree pax ce1E 
~ui 11"', supprime--par cela ou elle se nie. f! 
29 Jeanne Delhomce, in EJ(i6~enti§..lisme Chret-i~: 
bbriel !~Er.s.~~" ed. Gilson, 140. 
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perhaps fruitful tool of' knmledge in his theory of' seoond re-
flection t 1 t seems olear thF.\t in the fU:::1otion thai; he 'c ~1~)igns to 
it only a negative knowledge of t:rn>~scendent reality is possible t 
which for a positive metaphysics is not e;;oueh. To deny to this 
fundameffltal intuition the possibility of being ref'leoted in 
thonght, and to deny to thought the possibility of knowing direct-
ly the object of the intuition, is to deny the intellectual per-
ceptj.on of being. Again Mr'roel 13 prevented from takine!he fineJ 
step toV'u"rd a metRph~:sical. realisr.1 that is validly intellectual. 
r':p,ri';a.in a.ssigns the cause of }larcel':3 :f'ailu..re on this pOint to 
the same dif:ficul ty indicated above in the discussion. of' !,,;[,rcel' s 
theory of mov/ledge gener~dly f;O 
If £' philosopher l}:aritain is specificDlly referring 
here to Marcell who is powerfully awC'.xe of the ontological 
mystery nevertheless 1s convinced that it cannot be an in-
tUition, it 1s because idealistic prepossessions do not 
suffer him to a.ddress hiLsel1' to his intellect .ps such, :.;~nd 
trust to it to sa.tisfy his sesI'eh. We cannot but see in 
this attitude the effect of rm unsu:rmounted pre judice a-
gainst the objectivity of the intellect, which is conceived 
idea.listically. In consequenoe of this prejudice he will 
seek to make contact with the ontologice,l mystery so to 
speak by c' circuitous route which leads through the sub-
jeoti ve dom~1.int therefore specifically by wey of' the obscure 
r:pprehension of love, f\nd thus skirts the object \r'ie term 
30 ITefaoe to !J;)etnJ2Ns~os, 60, n; cf Collins, ltGBbriel 
tiarcel and the Mystery of'13eIng,"'I'r ~o~ShJ, XVIII, 691, n. 40: 
"What Marcel woult1 dispute is his alleged reduction of intention-
fility to a pure experienoe, together \!.Jith the ch[,:1"ge that he can ... 
ceives the intelleot idealistlcf1 lly I',nd returns the discussion to 
the subjeotive domnin •••• On the traditional vie\,,'. the de-
liveranoes of Marcel's med1tp+:ions are true, but do not convey 
formally ontological truth by ranson of pn incomplete disengage-
ment of being from its concrete embodiment ff 
being. This object, however, is not; screen, it is being 
itself. ~'herefore love does not reDlly skirt it but e~1ters 
it after its fashion, feS does intellect after its ovm. en 
the "other side n of it there is only nothingness. 
Now, to add that r:f)rcel ent ersthe domEin of being by 
!Nay of the apprehension of love brines us to_B point where it 
would seem that Marcel can be met by trc,d1 tionfi.l scholastic phil-
osophy.31 
In recognizinG that it is only through love that t: sub-
ject c~m go out from itself end enter into the very subjectivity 
of a 11other, which is truly to sha.re in t~le other f s existeooe, 
MFJroel simply affirms from, Another point of view WhE~t contempor-
ar.:l soholastios, following ~;t. Thomas, indioate when they speak 
of love as being more unitive than knowled.ge. 32 While the inten-
tional union of knowledge is metp.physioally c, more perfect union. 
being more spiritual, it is less efficaoious pnd less intimate 
than the affeotive union of leve, which does not presc1nd from 
31 In viAW of the expos1 tion of r'·:f~rcel t s philosophy 
given in this paper, it; 1s perhpas unnecessary to x'emark that 
there are ma.ny other points on 1!\.hich rapI'ort o(Cm be established, 
for example, on the plc::.ce of subjeotivity f·S a v(;,lid E'.prroDch to 
philosophy, or, following the lines sketohed by de Corte (~ 
Philosol?h1e de G. rv:., 68-70), in the field of ethios or ot' prac-
tical KrioWIedge -where the judgement takes priority over the con-
cept. De Corte believes th.rt it 1s here that ME,rcel offers the 
grer:test pos1 ti ve oont:ribution to philosophy. Cf. L. B. Geiger t 
o. r., ttFucistent1nlisme, essentialisme at ontologie eXistentielle," 
E.'tienne Gilson, Ph1losop~ ~ phrfotiente, edt J. :Maritain, .!!. 
~., ~36~r. 
32 E.g., Etienne Gilson. g Thomisme,t 5th edition, 
Pnris, 1948, 384. 
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the concrete oonditions of material existenoe. The case is some-
whBt different when it is a question of union with God in the 
Beatific Vision. Here where union is the result of direot vision 
whioh, absOlutely speaking, preoedes love, M~xoelts thought needs 
modificat10n. 
While in the order of purely speoulative knowledge one 
oan speak of the rale of love only in relation to the love of 
truth, in the order of praotioal knowledge it must be said that 
~ 
love itself modifies knowledge,'; Thus, we see that in loving 
another we oome also to a better knowledge of that other. And 
this is so beoause in love the other 1s present in his totality, 
so to speak, enabling the one who loves to pass beyond a know-
ledge by concepts and know the other by a kind of connaturality: 
Hon saulemant, lfamour pousse le sujet l soruter tou-jours plus 8vant les protondeurs de son objet, mats par lu1~ 
mime, il d1t pr'senoe myst6rieuse et r'oiproque de I'un l 
Itautrej par In1.-mlme, i1 unit lfam.- et l'a1m', 11 les 
"Oonnstura11se." de telle sorte que I'un n's qu'A se regard-
ex' v1vre et sentir et penser pour oonneltre, tout autrement 
que par concepts, leI r6aotions singu11~res de ltautre.34 
What exists in the oonorete 1s subsisting things--sub-
jeots, not objeots-... a.nd, as s subject, the oone:rete existent 1s 
inexhaustible to knowledge. In the meS.sure in whioh we employ 
oonoeptual knowledge in the attempt to penetrate another subject, 
• « 
" Joseph de '1nane., S. J., .!l!:! .!! All,r. Paris, 
1945, 327. 
'4 Ib1d., 328. 
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that sub3ect beoomes an object, is oonverted from a Thou to a He, 
- -
and in that meusure 1s 1mpenetrable to us. 35 ,As Je,oques Maritain 
as also Shown. 36 both the eXistential subjeot and the act of 
existing transcend the concept oons1dered as the terminus of 
simple apprehension. We oannot, then. know another as subjeot: 
Beins the only subject which 1s a subject for me in the 
midst of a world of subjeots whioh my sense and my intelli-
gence oan know only 8S objects, I am .-t; the oentre ot the 
world •••• With regard'lllto my subjectivity in 8.ot. I !! 
the oentre of the world. J1 
Maroel has described the transformation of objeot to subjeot in 
the term1nolo81 of the He and !thou, where the one 1s un1ted to 
- -
the other in the spiritual union of a vital co-esse. In fine, 
--
By love, finally, 1s shattered the 1mpossibility of 
knowing another except 8S object •••• !o say that union 
in love makes the being we love another ourself for U$ is 
to say that it makes that being another sub3eot1v1ty for 
us, another subjectivity that 1s ours. To the degree that 
we truly love (which 1s to say, not tor ourselves but for 
the belovedl and .hen ....... which is not always the oase ... -the 
intellect within us becomes pass1ve as regards love, and, 
allowing its conoepts to slumber. thereby renders love a 
formal means of knowled8e), to this degree we aoquire an 
oDsaure knowledge of the being we love, similar to that 
which we possess of ourselves; we know thBt being in his 
very subjeot1vity (at least in 8 oertain measure) by this 
experienoe of union. Then he himself 18, in 8 oertain 
35 Maroel, ~~ins and Ravin!, 13, n. ,. "the object .s 
suoh i8 by definition e.ocessIDre to me, but not penetrable. It 
1s the Other, or more exaotly the Thou, which is penetrable." 
;6 Jacques Marita1n, Bx1stenoe and the Existent, tr~ns. 
GHlant1ere and Phelan, 'Jew York, 194ft. t;3.- - .. 
'7 Ibid., 74-75. 
-
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degree, oured ot his so11tudel he oan,' though still d1s-
quieted, rest for a moment in the nest ot' the knowledge 
that 'lie possess of him fl.$ subjeot. 38 
In emphasizing the noetic funot1on of love, Karoel 
recognizes the demands of any philosophy of the concrete. If 
suoh a philosophy is to l:lring us to a knowledge of things of this 
VIlorid as they exist 1n their singularity and mater1ali"t;y, the 
rele of love oannot be negleoted. On the contrary, 1ts importano 
and necessity oalls tor even greater oonsideration and expiana.tio 
. ../ 
on the part of philosophers. 'Nevertheless, it must also be noted 
that while the intelligenoe cannot do without love, ne1ther oan 
love do without the intelligenoe. As Maroel htmself statest 
L'amour n'est plus rien, au moment o~ i1 se d188001e 
soiemment de 1s. oonne1ssance!- du moment au 11 sten d1s60016, 
11 nlest plus (pour lui-mame qufnne conne1ssanoe illusoire 
6t volontairement 1d'al1s'e. 9 
50 Marcel affirms the demand ot love tor knowledge, but 1t 18 
also true that he m1n1mi~es 1t in relegat1ng knowledge in itself 
as a means of attaining the real in its several orders ot being 
to an 1n:ter1or place. It is, after all, not by his will that 
man 1s differentiated from lower oreation, nor by his will that 
he shares in his most perfeot likeness to God, bat rather by his 
intelleot. 
Iii f 
,0 Ibid., 84. 
-
39 Journ!l m6tapAls1iue , 6'_ 
75. 
We bave indicated at some length Wherein Maroel seems 
in the construotion of his partioular philosophioal views. 
t 1s hoped that the line of oritioism followed is not too harsh 
it will not be taken A.S B oritioism of the whole of 
expression. laroel has muoh of value to contribute to 
ontemporary philosophioal speculat1on, c.nd his shortoomings are 
ot due to the essential nature of his own philosophical insp1r-
t10n and orienta:t1on. It has not been our purpose to give a 
fmeral evalua.tion of Me.X"cel t s thought, but 1n conclusion we 
hould like to note, 1n c~eement with de Oorte and others, that 
t would seem that a genuine and ~al1d philosophy of the oon-
ete,A Christian existentialism, if you wl11, i8 oertainly pos-
1ble along the lines proposed by Maroel.40 It may well be that 
uoh a pb11osophy (an onto-phenomenology as de Corte desoribe$ 
t) cannot of i~eelf beoome a soienoe of metaphysios in the 
riot sensa since it 1s ~8sent1alll concerned with conoret1zed 
eins and immediate experienoe, whioh ~res~RRoses a realist1c 
etaphys1cs of being. Bevertheless, in the measure in which it 
rees itself from the last traoes of idealism and recognizes the 
of its data and ita method, 1t oan offer a valuable 
philosophy striotly so-08lled. 
40 de Oorte, La Pb110aOfhie de G. M., 77-105; Etienne 
ilson, "Thomisme et les-pnI1osop~es· eiIstentielles." ~!!! 
telleotuelle. FariS, June, 1945, 118. 
.. 
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